Virtual Colloquium: Timothy Perrine, “Skeptical Theism and Practical Reasoning”

Today’s virtual colloquium paper is “Skeptical Theism and Practical Reasoning” by Timothy Perrine. Perrine is a graduate student at Indiana University, where he is finishing his
Today’s virtual colloquium paper is “Skeptical Theism and Practical Reasoning” by Timothy Perrine. Perrine is a graduate student at Indiana University, where he is finishing his [More]

Virtual Colloquium: Jeanine Diller, “Global and Local Atheisms”

Today’s Virtual Colloquium is “Global and Local Atheisms” by Jeanine Diller. Dr. Diller received her PhD from the University of Michigan and is currently an assistant professor in
Today’s Virtual Colloquium is “Global and Local Atheisms” by Jeanine Diller. Dr. Diller received her PhD from the University of Michigan and is currently an assistant professor in [More]

Virtual Colloquium: Chad McIntosh, “How to be a Rational Foundationalist”

This week’s Virtual Colloquium paper is “How to be a Rational Foundationalist” by Chad McIntosh. McIntosh is a PhD student at Cornell writing a dissertation entitled Rational
This week’s Virtual Colloquium paper is “How to be a Rational Foundationalist” by Chad McIntosh. McIntosh is a PhD student at Cornell writing a dissertation entitled Rational [More]

A Theistic Dilemma

Here’s a dilemma that might be worrisome for theists. Consider, first, the thesis in  (1). 1. Possibly, God actualizes a morally perfect possible world or a morally very good possible world.
Here’s a dilemma that might be worrisome for theists. Consider, first, the thesis in  (1). 1. Possibly, God actualizes a morally perfect possible world or a morally very good possible world. [More]

Mere Addition

Stephen Grover offers an interesting version of the Mere Addition Paradox (‘Mere Addition and the Best of all Possible Worlds’, Religious Studies, 1999) against Swinburne’s brief
Stephen Grover offers an interesting version of the Mere Addition Paradox (‘Mere Addition and the Best of all Possible Worlds’, Religious Studies, 1999) against Swinburne’s brief [More]

Evil and Compatibilism

There is widespread belief that compatibilism + theism cannot offer a credible solution to the logical problem of evil. Why does anyone believe that? I think they’re reasoning this way: if
There is widespread belief that compatibilism + theism cannot offer a credible solution to the logical problem of evil. Why does anyone believe that? I think they’re reasoning this way: if [More]

The Leveling Argument

Here is an interesting theistic argument that I call the ‘leveling argument’.  The leveling argument takes as a premise the common assumption in (1). I agree that (1) is tendentious. 1.
Here is an interesting theistic argument that I call the ‘leveling argument’.  The leveling argument takes as a premise the common assumption in (1). I agree that (1) is tendentious. 1. [More]

Adams on Creating the Best

Robert Adams famously argued that an unsurpassable being need not actualize the best possible world. Adams urges that he does not believe that there is a best world, but assumes there’s one
Robert Adams famously argued that an unsurpassable being need not actualize the best possible world. Adams urges that he does not believe that there is a best world, but assumes there’s one [More]

A Multiverse Solution?

The multiverse solution to the problem(s) of evil (and the problem of suboptimality) is a systematic response to these problems, and one that is fairly popular. Still, lot’s of people have
The multiverse solution to the problem(s) of evil (and the problem of suboptimality) is a systematic response to these problems, and one that is fairly popular. Still, lot’s of people have [More]

Multiverse Help?

The multiverse solution to the problem(s) of evil (and the problem of suboptimality) is a systematic response to these problems, and one that is fairly popular. Still, lot’s of people have
The multiverse solution to the problem(s) of evil (and the problem of suboptimality) is a systematic response to these problems, and one that is fairly popular. Still, lot’s of people have [More]