On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Further Evidence for Cross-Cultural Uniformity of Epistemic Intuitions - Short Report

As some (hopefully many) of you know, several years ago I started an effort to systematically replicate diverse results from the experimental philosophy literature. That work produced two papers
As some (hopefully many) of you know, several years ago I started an effort to systematically replicate diverse results from the experimental philosophy literature. That work produced two papers [More]

Recent Papers on Gettier Attribution Roundup

With a lot of researchers and labs now experimentally investigating cognitive evaluations in Gettier and Gettier-style cases, I thought it might be helpful to post some links for those interested in
With a lot of researchers and labs now experimentally investigating cognitive evaluations in Gettier and Gettier-style cases, I thought it might be helpful to post some links for those interested in [More]

Professional Philosophers' Susceptibility to Order Effects and Framing Effects in Evaluating Moral Dilemmas

Fiery Cushman and I have a new paper in draft, exploring the question of whether professional philosophers' judgments about moral dilemmas are less influenced than non-philosophers' by factors such
Fiery Cushman and I have a new paper in draft, exploring the question of whether professional philosophers' judgments about moral dilemmas are less influenced than non-philosophers' by factors such [More]

Philosophical Expertise?

There is no such thing. I have a paper on the expertise defense forthcoming in Metaphilosophy that may be of interest to readers of the blog. Three Arguments against the Expertise Defense
There is no such thing. I have a paper on the expertise defense forthcoming in Metaphilosophy that may be of interest to readers of the blog. Three Arguments against the Expertise Defense [More]

Folk Teleology and Persistence: Debunking Folk Intuitions and Endorsing the Expertise Defense

How do ordinary material objects persist? For instance, if a rock is smashed to pieces with a hammer, does it survive the smashing? Or, if a rock is hit with a hammer and chipped, does the rock
How do ordinary material objects persist? For instance, if a rock is smashed to pieces with a hammer, does it survive the smashing? Or, if a rock is hit with a hammer and chipped, does the rock [More]

Ethics Symposium: Experiment and Intuition in Ethics

One of the greatest issues of Ethics has recently been published: Vol. 124, No. 4 (a Symposium on Experiment and Intuition in Ethics). Contents include: Introduction Henry S. Richardson Principles
One of the greatest issues of Ethics has recently been published: Vol. 124, No. 4 (a Symposium on Experiment and Intuition in Ethics). Contents include: Introduction Henry S. Richardson Principles [More]

More on fake-barn intuitions: Replications of Colaco et al.

For everyone who has commented on the paper and offered feedback, thank you very much. Two attempts at replication have been made: one by John Turri (n=196 after comp checks), the other by Joshua
For everyone who has commented on the paper and offered feedback, thank you very much. Two attempts at replication have been made: one by John Turri (n=196 after comp checks), the other by Joshua [More]

Do older people have different epistemic intuitions than younger people? A study on fake-barn intuitions

Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich, Edouard Machery and I recently had a paper published in Episteme, titled 'Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments'. Here is the abstract: In
Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich, Edouard Machery and I recently had a paper published in Episteme, titled 'Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments'. Here is the abstract: In [More]

New paper on the philosophical role of x-phi

The post is to point readers to a forthcoming article of potential interest: 'X-phi and Carnapian explication'. I co-authored it with James Justus. In the paper we try to bring together experimental
The post is to point readers to a forthcoming article of potential interest: 'X-phi and Carnapian explication'. I co-authored it with James Justus. In the paper we try to bring together experimental [More]

Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander on Philosophy TV

Readers of Experimental Philosophy might be interested in this episode of Philosophy TV in which Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander discuss the evidential role of intuitions in philosophy
Readers of Experimental Philosophy might be interested in this episode of Philosophy TV in which Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander discuss the evidential role of intuitions in philosophy [More]