Professional Philosophers' Susceptibility to Order Effects and Framing Effects in Evaluating Moral Dilemmas

Fiery Cushman and I have a new paper in draft, exploring the question of whether professional philosophers' judgments about moral dilemmas are less influenced than non-philosophers' by factors such
Fiery Cushman and I have a new paper in draft, exploring the question of whether professional philosophers' judgments about moral dilemmas are less influenced than non-philosophers' by factors such [More]

Philosophical Expertise?

There is no such thing. I have a paper on the expertise defense forthcoming in Metaphilosophy that may be of interest to readers of the blog. Three Arguments against the Expertise Defense
There is no such thing. I have a paper on the expertise defense forthcoming in Metaphilosophy that may be of interest to readers of the blog. Three Arguments against the Expertise Defense [More]

Why Do Experiments?

On psychologist Simine Vazire's always-excellent blog, sometimes i'm wrong, there is an excerpt from John Doris's forthcoming book that reacts to #repligate. Doris makes many important points about
On psychologist Simine Vazire's always-excellent blog, sometimes i'm wrong, there is an excerpt from John Doris's forthcoming book that reacts to #repligate. Doris makes many important points about [More]

Folk Teleology and Persistence: Debunking Folk Intuitions and Endorsing the Expertise Defense

How do ordinary material objects persist? For instance, if a rock is smashed to pieces with a hammer, does it survive the smashing? Or, if a rock is hit with a hammer and chipped, does the rock
How do ordinary material objects persist? For instance, if a rock is smashed to pieces with a hammer, does it survive the smashing? Or, if a rock is hit with a hammer and chipped, does the rock [More]

Scientism, Quietism and Continental Philosophy

Peter Unger was recently interviewed about his new book that critiques Analytic Philosophy, and in the interview he says a lot of things that plenty of Continental Philosophers would not disagree
Peter Unger was recently interviewed about his new book that critiques Analytic Philosophy, and in the interview he says a lot of things that plenty of Continental Philosophers would not disagree [More]

How to Better X-Phi

Many readers of this blog have probably already seen the latest issue of Emotion Review, which features Nina Strohminger's review of Colin McGinn's book on disgust. There is also a terrific set of
Many readers of this blog have probably already seen the latest issue of Emotion Review, which features Nina Strohminger's review of Colin McGinn's book on disgust. There is also a terrific set of [More]

New paper on the philosophical role of x-phi

The post is to point readers to a forthcoming article of potential interest: 'X-phi and Carnapian explication'. I co-authored it with James Justus. In the paper we try to bring together experimental
The post is to point readers to a forthcoming article of potential interest: 'X-phi and Carnapian explication'. I co-authored it with James Justus. In the paper we try to bring together experimental [More]

Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander on Philosophy TV

Readers of Experimental Philosophy might be interested in this episode of Philosophy TV in which Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander discuss the evidential role of intuitions in philosophy
Readers of Experimental Philosophy might be interested in this episode of Philosophy TV in which Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander discuss the evidential role of intuitions in philosophy [More]

In the Thick of Moral Motivation

Suppose you had a genuine moral belief about something, and all that abiding by it required was pushing a little blue button on your desk. It would literally cost you nothing to do it, other than
Suppose you had a genuine moral belief about something, and all that abiding by it required was pushing a little blue button on your desk. It would literally cost you nothing to do it, other than [More]