Epistemic Intuitions are Shockingly Robust Across Cultural Differences

Around a year ago, I wrote about a really beautiful study by Machery and colleagues on cross-cultural similarities in epistemic intuitions. The study looked at intuitions about Gettier cases in four
Around a year ago, I wrote about a really beautiful study by Machery and colleagues on cross-cultural similarities in epistemic intuitions. The study looked at intuitions about Gettier cases in four [More]

Believing the unlikely

We often want to know how likely something is. There seems to be close link between likelihood and belief – if something is likely, you would be justified in believing it, and if something is
We often want to know how likely something is. There seems to be close link between likelihood and belief – if something is likely, you would be justified in believing it, and if something is [More]

Experimental Philosophy and the Law

Some of you may be interested in "Belief States in Criminal Law," a forthcoming article I recently posted on SSRN. It's an updated version of the paper I presented at last year's X-Phi conference at
Some of you may be interested in "Belief States in Criminal Law," a forthcoming article I recently posted on SSRN. It's an updated version of the paper I presented at last year's X-Phi conference at [More]

Chomsky and Moral Philosophy

Some experimental philosophers might be interested in "Chomsky and Moral Philosophy," a new paper I recently posted on SSRN. It will appear in the second edition of The Cambridge Companion to
Some experimental philosophers might be interested in "Chomsky and Moral Philosophy," a new paper I recently posted on SSRN. It will appear in the second edition of The Cambridge Companion to [More]

Why Gettier Cases are misleading

I think that some readers of Experimental Philosophy, especially those who work on Gettier cases, might be interested in this paper (even though it is not an experimental paper). Abstract: In this
I think that some readers of Experimental Philosophy, especially those who work on Gettier cases, might be interested in this paper (even though it is not an experimental paper). Abstract: In this [More]

Negative Public Perceptions of Philosophical Research

Philosophy is not always perceived as well as philosophers would like. There are public discussions of whether philosophy has any value at all (The New York Times or The Chronicle of Higher
Philosophy is not always perceived as well as philosophers would like. There are public discussions of whether philosophy has any value at all (The New York Times or The Chronicle of Higher [More]

Believing What You Know is Not True

Embed from Getty Images “I believe in God, and there are things that I believe that I know are crazy. I know they’re not true.” –Stephen Colbert   While Stephen Colbert ended up as a
Embed from Getty Images “I believe in God, and there are things that I believe that I know are crazy. I know they’re not true.” –Stephen Colbert   While Stephen Colbert ended up as a [More]

Threat Assessment II: Demons of Fear & Anger

Embed from Getty Images In the previous essay on threat assessment I looked at the influence of availability heuristics and fallacies that directly relate to errors in reasoning about statistics and
Embed from Getty Images In the previous essay on threat assessment I looked at the influence of availability heuristics and fallacies that directly relate to errors in reasoning about statistics and [More]

Trump & Truth

View image | gettyimages.com As this is being written at the end of November, Donald Trump is still the leading Republican presidential candidate. While some might take the view that this is in
View image | gettyimages.com As this is being written at the end of November, Donald Trump is still the leading Republican presidential candidate. While some might take the view that this is in [More]

Three Options in the Epistemology of Philosophy

You pursue your arguments as far as they go, and eventually reach your bedrock assumptions: foundational premises that you accept (and might describe as seeming 'intuitive' to you), but that you can
You pursue your arguments as far as they go, and eventually reach your bedrock assumptions: foundational premises that you accept (and might describe as seeming 'intuitive' to you), but that you can [More]