The Truth about Lying

Photo credit: Tristan Schmurr Lying is an important social and moral category. We react negatively to liars and their lies. But what is it to lie? The standard view in philosophy and social science
Photo credit: Tristan Schmurr Lying is an important social and moral category. We react negatively to liars and their lies. But what is it to lie? The standard view in philosophy and social science [More]

X-Phi, Rationalism, and Naturalism

Routledge is publishing a new volume edited by Eugen Fischer and John Collins entitled, Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. The list of
Routledge is publishing a new volume edited by Eugen Fischer and John Collins entitled, Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. The list of [More]

The Moral Brain (MIT Press)

MIT Press has just published what appears to be an excellent volume entitled The Moral Brain: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (edited by Jean Decety and Thalia Wheatley). Given the topics covered
MIT Press has just published what appears to be an excellent volume entitled The Moral Brain: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (edited by Jean Decety and Thalia Wheatley). Given the topics covered [More]

Call for Abstracts: Experimental Philosophy UK

Experimental Philosophy Group UK -- 6th Annual Workshop Event Date: 29-30 June 2015 Deadline: 31 March 2015 Call for abstracts for presentations and posters. All abstracts are welcome which either
Experimental Philosophy Group UK -- 6th Annual Workshop Event Date: 29-30 June 2015 Deadline: 31 March 2015 Call for abstracts for presentations and posters. All abstracts are welcome which either [More]

CFP: Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference 2015

CFP: Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference 2015 Submission deadline: Monday, June 1, 2015 Conference dates: Fri., Sept. 11 – Sat., Sept. 12, 2015 Conference Venue: Embassy Suites
CFP: Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference 2015 Submission deadline: Monday, June 1, 2015 Conference dates: Fri., Sept. 11 – Sat., Sept. 12, 2015 Conference Venue: Embassy Suites [More]

Are "Internal Reasons" Normative?

Bernard Williams, in his 'Internal and External Reasons', introduces the internal interpretation of 'A has a reason to ϕ' as "impl[ying], very roughly, that A has some motive which will be
Bernard Williams, in his 'Internal and External Reasons', introduces the internal interpretation of 'A has a reason to ϕ' as "impl[ying], very roughly, that A has some motive which will be [More]

Information and Parfit's Fact Stating Argument

In Chapter 26 of On What Matters (vol 2), Parfit sets out his (comparatively neglected) 'Fact-Stating Argument' against non-analytical moral naturalism.  This begins by distinguishing the
In Chapter 26 of On What Matters (vol 2), Parfit sets out his (comparatively neglected) 'Fact-Stating Argument' against non-analytical moral naturalism.  This begins by distinguishing the [More]

Thoughts on 'Non-Consequentialism Demystified'

'Non-Consequentialism Demystified' is a really interesting new paper in Phil Imprint by Nye, Plunkett & Ku.  It makes two moves, in particular, that I want to focus on in this
'Non-Consequentialism Demystified' is a really interesting new paper in Phil Imprint by Nye, Plunkett & Ku.  It makes two moves, in particular, that I want to focus on in this [More]

Cancelling Schroeder's "Implicature" Response to Parfit's Trivality Objection

According to Parfit's Triviality Objection, metaethical naturalism can't adequately capture our ability to make substantive positive normative claims.  For example, suppose a subjectivist
According to Parfit's Triviality Objection, metaethical naturalism can't adequately capture our ability to make substantive positive normative claims.  For example, suppose a subjectivist [More]

Question about Language, Logic - Richard Heck responds

Suppose I have never played a game of chess. If I now make the claim that I've won all the games of chess I've ever played, is that claim true, false, or undefined? A group of friends had an
Suppose I have never played a game of chess. If I now make the claim that I've won all the games of chess I've ever played, is that claim true, false, or undefined? A group of friends had an [More]