Cognitive Disability and Moral Status

[Revised entry by David Wasserman, Adrienne Asch, Jeffrey Blustein, and Daniel Putnam on August 11, 2017. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] Why are cognitive disability and moral
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[Revised entry by David Wasserman, Adrienne Asch, Jeffrey Blustein, and Daniel Putnam on August 11, 2017. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] Why are cognitive disability and moral status thought to be sufficiently connected to warrant a separate entry? The reason is that individuals with cognitive disabilities have served as test cases in debates about the moral relevance of possessing such intellectual attributes as self-consciousness and practical rationality. If a significant portion of human beings lacks self-consciousness and practical rationality, then those attributes cannot by themselves distinguish the way we treat cognitively developed human beings from...

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News source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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