Top News, Articles, and Interviews in Philosophy

BSPR 2010 Conference - God, Mind and Knowledge

The British Society for the Philosophy of Religion 2011 Conference: God, Mind and Knowledge Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford ---Call for Papers--- The next conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion will be at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford from Wednesday 14th - Friday 16th September 2011. The theme for the conference will be God, Mind and Knowledge. The plenary speakers will be John Cottingham, Anthony Kenny, Robin Le Poidevin, and Charles Taliaferro. If you would like to present a paper, please send an abstract of a maximum of 300 words to Andrew Moore by the end of March. Papers need not be on the theme of the conference, although a preference may be displayed towards selecting those that are, other things being equal. Obviously time and space at the Conference will be limited, so we shall have to be selective, even allowing for the fact that we plan to run parallel sessions and encourage people presenting papers to keep to half-hour slots. In order to keep to the tight timetabling required to permit participants to hear (the whole of) as many papers as possible, papers should take ideally fifteen minutes and an absolute maximum twenty minutes to deliver, leaving ten minutes or so for discussion. Reposted from The Prosblogion

Eighth Annual Formal Epistemology Workshop

We are in the process of organizing our eighth annual formal epistemology workshop. The purpose of these workshops is to bring together faculty and graduate students with an interest in the use of formal methods in epistemology (broadly construed) in small, focused meetings. Topics of interest include (but are not limited to) the following: • Ampliative inference (including inductive logic); • Foundations of probability and statistics; • Epistemic Logics and theories of belief revision; • Game theory and decision theory (including social choice theory); • Issues at the interface between formal and traditional epistemology. The eighth workshop is scheduled for May 19 – 21, 2011 and will be held at the University of Southern California. The website for the workshop is (as usual): http://fitelson.org/few/ We are now accepting submissions for FEW 2011. Please send submissions by email to Branden Fitelson . Submissions are due — in the form of full papers — by March 1, 2011; notifications of acceptance either as definite presenters or as alternates will be sent out by April 1, 2011. It is likely that some of the papers presented at FEW 2011 will appear in a special issue of the Journal of Philosophical Logic. In addition to contributed papers, we will also have three keynote lectures. We are delighted to have the following three keynote speakers this year: Mark Colyvan, Chris Hitchcock, and Deborah Mayo. Those interested in participating in the workshop (e.g., by commenting on a paper or helping with organization, etc.) should contact one of the organizers listed below. We will be able to contribute $250 in travel funds for each graduate student who presents or comments on a paper. Our funding is limited this year, however, so it is unlikely that we will be able to provide funding for people who are not on the program. Kenny Easwaran Shieva Kleinschmidt USC Branden Fitelson Rutgers   Reposted from Certain Doubts

Religion and Psychology

The author of the site Epiphenom has compiled an interesting roll up of studies related to religion and social practice, mental health, and politics (among other things). His compilation includes the impact religious belief has on things like smoking and overeating, racism, sexual behavior, and giving blood. He links to studies that focused on religion and education particularly how religious people view science and the impact literature has on religious belief. See his report here. Link reposed from Common Sense Atheism

Avoiding Responsibility in Ten Easy Steps

UPDATED: 1/1/2011 I had a fruitful discussion with Jack Angstreich about Strawson’s article below. Based on that discussion and other material by Strawson that Jack pointed me to, it’s become clear to me that my analysis below is wrongheaded and that I initially badly misunderstood Strawson’s argument in the NYT piece. I read the argument in haste and wrongly made the assumption that Strawson both assumed a materialist view of the mind and also was attempting to argue that individuals are not morally responsible based on that fact. Jack pointed out that Strawson’s argument makes (or at least requires) no  metaphysical assumptions in order to work and that his argument is focused on mental states regardless of the metaphysical view one has regarding the mind. I think this is mostly correct and have come to see that Strawson’s argument is quite strong. As I now see it, Strawson is attempting to argue that individuals cannot be morally responsible because one’s moral decisions are an outcome of the way one is at the time the decision is made. I originally took this to mean that the state of one’s brain and body prior to a moral act (antecedent conditions) determines one moral actions. But I now see that Strawson is only concerned with the state of one’s mental life at the moment of a moral decision—it doesn’t matter whether determinism is true or indeterminism is true, whether one is a dualist or a materialist. The reason it doesn’t matter is because the argument claims that a moral decision is the outcome of the mental state of the person (the development of much of that mental state being out of the persons direct or indirect control) and this is true regardless of one’s metaphysics. Suppose you face the decision to put money in the Oxfam tin. The following may be true: ~ You want to help the poor person ~ You believe you can afford it ~ You want to feel better about yourself But suppose the follow also are true ~ You want cake really badly ~ You're tired of people begging for money and don't want to support it ~ You promised your spouse you'd bring home the cake Let’s suppose you choose not to put money in the tin. One could argue that the above six antecedent beliefs and desires are in moral parity for you: they neither determine that you’ll act (put money in the tin) or refrain from acting (withhold money from the tin). Now let’s also suppose the following: dualism is true (you have a non-material soul) that possesses an active power over which you have control and that you’re rational (generally considered three necessary conditions for a free act on Libertarianism). Let’s also assume that it makes sense to say you can choose to act or refrain from acting in this case. This means that your action is strictly uncaused but choose to act or refrain from acting in order to meet some yet not-realized goal. Since the antecedent conditions do not determine your actions, why did you make the choice you did? If we ask why you refrained, there either is an answer to that question or there isn’t (this isn’t merely an epistemological claim—I’m saying there is or is not a metaphysical antecedent that explains the decision). If there isn’t, then the choice appears to be random and violates the third of the three necessary conditions for a free act. If there is a reason (let’s say you acted because you put more value in the second set of beliefs and desires more than the first), then that value judgment would be included in the first of Strawson’s premises in the Basic Argument: You do what you do — in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are. In this situation, we could capture this by asking, “why did you value the second set over the first such that it influence your decision?” If your decision was truly yours, it came out of the state you were in at the time of the decision the development of which may be partly or entirely out of your control. How, then, could you be responsible for the choice to value the second rather than the first set and thus for the choice to refrain from putting money in the tin? Of course Libertarians would not say that one’s character (I think we could substitute “the state of one’s mental life”) at the point of any moral decision is not important in decision making. However Libertarians would argue, I think, that it’s possible to act in a way other than what your character might dictate (without this power, one might run into problems similar to the one presented in the Reformer’s Dilemma). Instead of the second set of reasons functioning as efficient causes (“that by means of which”), they function as final causes (“that for the sake of which”). The problem for this response is in how one ought to understand how the notion of final causality works here. If a person chooses to refrain from putting money in the tin for the sake of meeting the goal of valuing the second set of beliefs and desires, isn’t it true that the person is in a state where she values the second set of beliefs and desires or at least in a state where she wants to be in a state where she values them? If the answer is yes, then we’re back to Strawson’s first premise; if no then we’re on the road to an infinite regress. There is much more to explore here but I acknowledge that Strawson’s argument is powerful and strikes at the heart of the free will debate. Thanks to Jack for setting me straight and for some thought-provoking discussion. Original post of July 23, 2010. Philosopher Galen Strawson for The New York Times philosophy column“The Stone” presents an argument (well, one argument in three different forms)--the logic of which he believes is irresistible--for why persons cannot be “ultimately” responsible. He argues that for any given choice we make, we do what we do based on the way we are at the moment. But the way we are is not under our control but is a product of our genes and previous experiences. If we did not choose and cannot change the way we are, and our choice is based on the way we are, then we are not ultimately responsible (I wonder if we’re proximately responsible—Strawson does not say) for the choice. Ian McEwan calls the argument watertight. The argument ends up being a reductivist argument popularly written. But reductionism is very much like behaviorism in that it fails to account for first person experience. If an argument proves I don’t see the color red when I’m looking at a red object, then so much the worse for the argument. (As Professor Daniel Robinson has said, “If your doctor tells you you’re not in pain when you are in pain, it’s time to find another doctor.”) Strawson’s argument also seems to be question begging. If he is attempting to ask whether our perception of freedom really is actual freedom, then his first premise (in the first version of the argument) seems to sneak in the conclusion: “You do what you do — in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are". But isn’t that what we want to know? Is it the case that we do what we do because of the way we then are or is it that we can act in ways other than the way we are? Perhaps we do what we do because of the way we want to be. Perhaps our perception that we are goal directed beings is an indication that we are goal directed beings and that the background belief that selves are completely governed by natural law is incomplete (or just plain false). Why does Strawson seem to think his argument is so strong? And I’m confident he would reject the claim that it’s question begging. Why does he deny that our experience of free acts are “feelings” only and do not represent any actual choice we’re making? Jaegwon Kim’s exclusion argument provides an answer. The argument goes like this. Physicallists (Kim would put himself in this camp) believe in the causal closure of the physical domain which he takes to involve the following conditional: if a physical event has a cause (occurring) at time t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. But, says Kim, this principle causes problems when it comes to mental events. More...

The Reports of Philosophy’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated

John Haldane for First Things says no. In fact, says Haldane, their arguments for M-theory are philosophical in nature and thus demonstrate the continued relevance of philosophy particularly in theoretical phyisics. Even if one disagrees with his analysis of Hawking and Mlodinow’s arguments, I think he’s correct that their pronouncement that philosophy is dead is somewhat undermined by their reliance on it. Thanks to Greg Taft for the link.

Call for abstracts: Experimental Philosophy

Mark Phelan is organizing the second annual Experimental Philosophy Workshop in New York City, and the Call for Abstracts has just been posted. Abstracts are only 1,000 words and can present either experimental results or more theoretical work. The deadline is February 10th. The conference itself will take place on March 26th. Invited speakers include Alvin Goldman, Kurt Gray, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, David Rosenthal, and Susanna Siegel. Although submitted abstracts can be on any aspect of experimental philosophy, the invited speakers will be focusing on folk attributions of consciousness.

Consciousness Online Final CFP

The deadline for contributed submissions to the 3rd Online Consciousness Conference at Consciousness Online is this Wednesday January 5th 2011. Submit papers to consciousnessonline@gmail.com This year the conference has as its theme Neurophilosophy and the Philosophy of Neuroscience with invited talks by Paul Churchland, Kathleen Akins with commentary by Pete Mandik, Stevan Harnad, and Jesse Prinz. I am also pleased to announce a special session organized by Jacob Berger featuring a paper by Benj Heille on Direct Realism and Perceptual Justification and respondents tba. Papers need not be related to the theme to be considered for inclusion in the conference but papers that are related to the theme will, pending additional external review, be published in the special issue of Synthese "Neuroscience and its Philosophy". For more information see the conference website; http://consciousnessonline.wordpress.com/

Kierkegaard and the Modern Religious Mind

For Søren Kierkegaard, being a Christian is like falling in love. Most passionate, erotic relationships are not rational nor should they be. They are not strictly irrational though reason doesn’t seem to apply to them. When two people fall in love, they may know very little about one another but this is not relevant; in fact its part of its virtue. Common sense becomes a ballast and the lovers discard it, intentionally or not, for the possibility that all the promises they hope are true will be realized. To those on the outside, their relationship may seem silly at best and dangerous or harmful at worst. Yet they jump in with both feet, critics and naysayers be damned. [More]

Good Even If Not True: Anderson on Religion

Bruce Anderson, for the Spectator, opines about his atheism and the factors that caused him to reject the Christianity of his youth. Religion is attractive, culturally indispensible, and may even be necessary. Unfortunately, it’s probably not true, says Anderson, and that creates his intellectual barrier. So why do I still abstain? For two reasons: realism, and science. The urgency of need cannot of itself summon the necessary help into being, as bank managers have been telling their customers down the ages. Although science cannot prove that God does not exist, it does make the search vastly more complicated. Thanks to Stan Dokupil for the link. Full article: http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6543688/confession-of-an-atheist.thtml

Faith and Reason in Tension

“Faith has declined in contemporary western culture because contemporary westerners have become emotionally and imaginatively impoverished. We have ceased to care in the right way about the right things.” – C. Stephen Evans, “Kierkegaard: An Introduction” Reason: If anyone is to have justified beliefs in what is true, then they must believe based on evidence and argument. Faith, you have little to offer when it comes to truth-gathering. Faith: You’re not the boss of me! Reason: If you mean by that odd remark to claim that faith is just as relevant to truth seeking, how do you know? What evidence do you have for such a claim? Faith: You always ask for evidence but you can’t provide evidence for the claim that you require evidence. Stop looking around for what does not exist and live your life, Reason! Reason: But what life should I live? How can I adjudicate between alternate possible lifestyles? Either one must live by reason or by faith. It is not the case that one should live by faith. Therefore one must live by reason.  Evidence for the second premise can be put in terms of the following modus tollens: If one should live by faith then any lifestyle will do. But it is not the case that any lifestyle will do. Therefore . . . Faith: Stop right there. I can only live the life that’s been given to me and that’s what I choose to do. Embrace life instead of sitting around mulling over pseudo-intellectual problems that have an appearance of significance! Reason: Faith, you appear to be making truth claims. What am I supposed to do with them? I’m happy to hear that you’re enjoying yourself but why tell me? If you want me to understand and, more importantly, believe, what you’re saying, I need to consider evidence provided through something that at least resembles an argument. If you disagree, why? (By the way, if you attempt to answer the ‘why question,’ you will need to use an argument to do so.) Faith: And the fullfed beast shall kick the empty pail.      For last year's words belong to last year's language      And next year's words await another voice. But, as the passage now presents no hindrance      To the spirit unappeased and peregrine      Between two worlds become much like each other, So I find words I never thought to speak      In streets I never thought I should revisit      When I left my body on a distant shore. Since our concern was speech, and speech impelled us      To purify the dialect of the tribe      And urge the mind to aftersight and foresight… Reason: This is hopeless. Faith: That’s the first thing you’ve said that I agree with. Over time, well-worn intellectual debates pick up a number of elements that analysts will tend to use as a pre-analytic framework and unpack the issue in light of that framework. Many times, the framework includes the very positions being debated and analysis may proceed without questioning whether those positions are valid ways to frame the debate. In the United States, the “pro choice” versus “pro life” labels used to describe the two opposing positions on abortion may be an example. On even a cursory inspection, these labels are grossly misleading and designed to foster unfortunate caricatures that not only stagnate any forward movement politically but frame this important issue in terms that don’t allow for any analytic success (even anecdotally, it seems obviously true that most in the “pro choice” camp are not at the same time “pro death” and those on the pro life side of the question actually do not eschew significant reproductive liberties). Are faith and reason opposed? Characterizing the discussion about the intellectual viability of religion in terms of “faith” versus “reason” has a long history. It’s both effortless and obvious to adopt these two monikers as labels for a real conflict. But are faith and reason really opposed? Is this the right way to think about the debate? More fundamentally, is there a debate at all? As I’ve attempted to show in previous essays, I believe the answer to all these questions is yes. There is manifest evidence that there has been and presently is tension over the validity and role of religious belief in a modern worldview and there is strong historical evidence that the tension is centered around what broadly can be understood as a distinction between a rational—or in contemporary language, scientific—understanding of the nature of things and one that uses faith as the locus for understanding the essential aspects of the world. But perhaps this distinction is only linguistic. Perhaps it is the case that all clear-thinking humans that aren’t suffering from some dysfunction and are really aimed towards seeking the truth are rational but many mistakenly create a façade which they call faith even though this term does not really refer to any actual epistemological or psychological construct. Some have argued that the ethical construct “altruism” is like this. Many, in a sort of folk-ethical way, believe they can and do sometimes act entirely for the interest of another with no self-interest involved. But, say some theorists, this is not actually possible. Any personal action, if it is goal directed and not capricious or random, ultimately is performed to satisfy some personal desire on the part of the agent performing the action. A simple bit of evidence for this is that every ethical “why” question—why did you step out in front of that car to save the cat—appears to involve answer centered on personal desire: I didn’t want the cat to die. While it seems undeniable that the hero performed a brave act involving the potential loss of her own life, the action is motivated by a personal desire to see some state of affairs come about. The cat’s life functioned as an object for the desire, not for the action. The desire should be considered the primary driver of the action at least insofar as an ethical analysis is concerned. Perhaps faith is like this. This does not seem to be the case. Thinkers on both sides of the question that have attempted to dig into the nature of the dichotomy have isolated fundamental epistemological and psychological differences between knowledge that comes by way of a rational analysis and knowledge that is grounded on what can broadly be called faith. Some key terms I’ve thus far used to capture this distinction are: essences and existence, first-person experience and third-person descriptions, and existentialism and rationalism. These terms appear to label real differences. As we saw in James, some view faith as a psychologically isolated approach to dealing with questions about aspects of reality that reason is incapable of unpacking. Reason may have its place, but it most certainly is limited in what it can do epistemically and psychologically. In the next few essays, I want to explore this distinction further by looking at some themes in Kierkegaard—arguably the foremost religious existentialist. Whereas James sought a both/and approach to the faith-reason dichotomy, Kierkegaard argues for an either/or  solution concluding that religion is essentially non-rational.  For Kierkegaard, the religious mode of existence is the more authentic way to live and so his distinction becomes central to his entire philosophy. It is necessary to remind the reader at this point that my central claim in this series is that proponents of religion in the contemporary West are attempting to ground their religious beliefs existentially but sustain and publicize their beliefs as a rational epistemology (and psychology). In this way, modern religionists are not pure Kierkegaardians in the strict sense but the modern Christian worldview has absorbed the spirit of Kierkegaard and seem to agree with his fundamental philosophy. By examining Kierkegaard’s thought, we may be able to gain better insight into why Western religion finds itself in the position it does and better understand where the modern debate is headed. Copyright © 2010 Philosophy News Service Series index << Previous in series Next in series >>    

Latest News


Here are some of the things going on in philosophy
and the humanities.

See all News Items

Philosopher Spotlight


Conversations with philosophers, professional and non-professional alike.
Visit our podcast section for more interviews and conversations.

Interview with

Dr. Robert McKim
  • on Religious Diversity
  • Professor of Religion and Professor of Philosophy
  • Focuses on Philosophy of Religion
  • Ph.D. Yale

Interview with

Dr. Alvin Plantinga
  • on Where the Conflict Really Lies
  • Emeritus Professor of Philosophy (UND)
  • Focuses on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion
  • Ph.D. Yale

Interview with

Dr. Peter Boghossian
  • on faith as a cognitive sickness
  • Teaches Philosophy at Portland State University (Oregon)
  • Focuses on atheism and critical thinking
  • Has a passion for teaching in prisons
See all interviews

30500

Twitter followers

10000+

News items posted

32000+

Page views per month

21 years

in publication

Latest Articles


\
See all Articles