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Normativity for Value Realists

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At the recent Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (great conference, btw), I was surprised to learn that Alastair Norcross doesn't believe in normative reasons.  He's happy to speak of "moral reasons", "prudential reasons", and even "Nazi reasons", but seems to view these all as objectively on a par. He happens to prefer the morality framework of standards to the Nazi one, and will condemn Nazis accordingly, but not in any way that implies that they are making an objective, framework-independent practical error.  In interpreting this view, since I don't think that framework-relative "reasons" are genuinely normative reasons at all ("Nazi reasons" do not count as providing genuine considerations in favour of genocide), Alastair's view strikes me as a form of normative nihilism.Interestingly, though, Alastair is a value realist.  He thinks there is intrinsic value (and disvalue), and seems to accepts a traditional hedonistic account of these (the wrong view, IMO, but not our topic for today).  Such Value Realism may naturally lead one to a broader Normative Realism, I think, in a couple of ways.  So I'll address the rest of my post to any readers who share Alastair's starting point of Value Realism without Normative Realism, and see whether either of these arguments is persuasive.First, we can ask whether you'd like to give up your Value Realism in favour of a relativistic view on which there's "hedonistic value", "desire-fulfilment value", and "Nazi value", all metaphysically on a par.  If not -- if there's really just one correct view of value, regardless of what subjective standards anyone might arbitrarily endorse -- then we can raise the question of why normative reasons don't move in parallel.  Surely an account of reasons for action that is grounded in facts about what's genuinely valuable is superior to an alternative account that bears no connection to the true value facts?This leaves open a Sidgwickian dualism of. . .

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