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Conscientious Sadism

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I've previously argued that sadistic pleasure (in oppressing the innocent) lacks value. But consider a complication.  Suppose this time that the sadistic majority are all conscientious utilitarians who would never willingly increase net suffering in the world.  They all appreciate that their victim's suffering is a bad thing in itself, and so would genuinely prefer to realize the same amount of pleasure without any suffering at all, if possible.  But alas, this just isn't possible in the circumstances.  We may further suppose that they would each be willing to themselves be tortured in order to generate greater net pleasure for their companions.  But alas, this isn't possible, either.  Their only options are to torture an unwilling innocent person, generating population-wide sadistic pleasure, or do nothing and have uniformly neutral experiences throughout the population.In this revised case, many will of course still think it would be wrong to torture the innocent.  But I wonder whether this assimilates it to a standard sort of rights-violation scenario (e.g. involving non-sadistic pleasure), or whether we should still regard the sadistic pleasure itself as entirely lacking in value?One possible test: suppose that, while the torture is ongoing, you're able to temporarily disable the pleasure-centers in all the sadists' brains.  Would disabling their sadistic pleasure in this way be good, bad, or neutral?  In the original (malicious sadists) case, I'm inclined to think good, whereas in this new case I'm more inclined to think that this intervention would be bad.  So that would seem to suggest that what's really driving my intuitions here is not the sadism per se but rather the malice (which seems missing in the new case).Though perhaps the case remains under-described.  Compare:(1) The conscientious sadists just really want to experience pleasure, and -- due to some weird quirk of their. . .

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