Kaitlyn Creasy, The Problem of Affective Nihilism in Nietzsche: Thinking Differently, Feeling Differently, Palgrave Macmillian, 2020, 200pp., $89.99 (hbk), ISBN 9783030371326.
Reviewed by Paul Katsafanas, Boston University
One of Nietzsche’s chief concerns is nihilism. Here is a partial list of things that Nietzsche calls nihilistic or associates with nihilism: Christianity and Christian morality; Buddhism; Schopenhauer; turning against one’s passions, affects, and desires; seeing the world as lacking purpose, direction, or meaning; seeing the world as having life-negating purposes, directions, or meanings; being dissatisfied with the world; being satisfied with the world while forgoing difficult goals; negating life; being indifferent to life’s values; inhabiting a culture in which the traditional values are beginning to collapse; and one could go on and on. As this expansive and apparently heterogeneous list indicates, there is no doubt that nihilism is one of Nietzsche’s central concerns. But there is a question about whether it is…
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