Four philosophers--and one psychologist--you've never heard of (but should know)

Even if you’re not a professional philosopher, you’ve heard of Plato and Kant and probably Russell and Descartes because of their enormous influence on just about everything academic. But what about great thinkers that rarely show up in introductory philosophy courses?

Even if you’re not a professional philosopher, you’ve heard of Plato and Kant and probably Russell and Descartes because of their enormous influence on just about everything academic. But what about great thinkers that rarely show up in introductory philosophy courses? While most professional philosophers are familiar with their names, to most people they don’t exist (if a philosopher isn’t known by the general public, do they have a thought?). Here are a few that either had one really good idea that’s worth knowing or got so many things right, they deserve to be on a list somewhere even if only 10 people in the history of mankind can understand them.

alt Thomas Reid – The only philosopher on my list who did his work prior to the 20th century, Reid is known as the “common sense” philosopher. Using the tools of philosophy, he came to the defense of the “poor, untaught mortals” against the professionals who pity “the credulity of the vulgar.” Just when philosophy was at risk of floating away, Reid tied it back down.
alt Roderick Chisholm – All of Chisholm’s books should come with a warning: reading this volume may cause blurry eyes, dizziness, and could lead to a severe case of anal retention. Chisholm is not for the faint of heart (or mind) but it is because we can stand on his shoulders that many of us are able to see farther. Chisholm examined the mind, free will, knowledge, personhood, perception etc. and was right on most of it (I think).
alt Saul Kripke - How many people do you know could publish a completeness theorem in modal logic at 18, develop a semantics of modal logic which would later be named after him, teach all that hard stuff at Harvard, Princeton, and MIT with just a Bachelor's degree, and be listed at number 7 on Brian Leiter's "The most important philosopher of the last 200 years”? Saul Kripke has done all of the above and more. His Naming and Necessity was, and is, a game changer.
alt John Searle – Someone once referred to Searle as philosophy’s “bad boy” because he has the annoying habit of following an idea wherever it leads. If he thinks an idea—even one he is supposed to agree with—is absurd, he’ll say it. Searle is one of the clearest, and most honest, philosophers writing. Dagmar is one lucky person.
Ernest Becker – Becker’s The Denial of Death is on my list of top 3 most personally influential books. Why do we do just about everything we do? Becker explains. And imagine, such a philosophically relevant book coming from a psychologist. Who knew?

Who’s on your list?

Postgraduate Scholarships at University of Birmingham 2011-2012

We are pleased to announce that applications are now open for the following postgraduate Scholarships for 2011-2012.

We welcome applicants interested in philosophy of religion. We currently have 11 MA students, 2 MPhil students and 3 PhD students in this specific area.

  1. AHRC doctoral awards (fees + maintenance) open to UK students and non-UK students who have been resident in the UK for at least 3 years for reasons other than education in the following disciplinary areas:
    Philosophy (1)
    Religious Studies (1)
  2. 12 College Doctoral Scholarships (Home/EU or Overseas, fees + maintenance) AHRC equivalent awards, open to UK, EU and international students in all disciplines in arts and law
  3. Up to 5 College Doctoral Overseas Scholarships (full-fees only)
  4. Up to 2 College MA/MPhil Overseas Scholarships (full-fees only)
  5. 2 fee remission (Home/EU) Scholarships in any Masters/MPhil Programme in Philosophy, Theology and Religion
  6. Dinshaw Bursary for Theology/Inter-religious studies (to be confirmed)

For more information please see:

OCC Program Finalized

The program for the third Online Consciousness Conference is finalized and is available at the conference website.

The conference begins February 18th and lasts until March 4th. Papers (but not commentaries) will be available to read one week before the conference starts February 11th. To be updated on conference events, subscribe to the rss feed at the conference website, or join them on Facebook.

Reposted from Brains

Religion and Evolutionary Value

Nick Spencer considers the question, “Is there a God Instinct” in a series for The Guardian. He concludes that evolutionary explanations—both modern and historical—for religion are severely lacking and that it appears that unbelief is what needs to be explained. Even if the claims of religion aren’t true, that fact won’t be determined by the hard sciences.

No longer able to find refuge in the idea that belief in God is an unnatural or neurotic accretion on human nature (save the rather clumsy virus metaphor that is still doing the rounds in some quarters), the atheist finds himself saying: "Yes, OK, religion may well be an inherent part of human nature, but that doesn't mean it is good or true.

Perhaps not, but few serious religious believers would claim that any scientific discipline is competent to adjudicate on the goodness or truth of religious claims.

See article

A Reflection on Elizabeth Anscombe

Mark Oppenheimer, for the New York Times, writes considers the impact and life of this influential Catholic philosopher (her philosophy and her life are inseparable, he says) who died a decade ago. More pointedly, he observes a resurgence in interest in her work and life. “Philosophers are primarily interested in Miss Anscombe’s action theory. But Professor Vogler says that a true appreciation of her includes the religious writing.”

See article.

CFP: Special Issue of *Philosophical Explorations* on “Extended Cognition and Epistemic Action”

Call for Papers

Special Issue of *Philosophical Explorations* on ”Extended Cognition and Epistemic Action”

Guest Editors: Andy Clark (University of Edinburgh), Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh), Krist Vaesen (Eindhoven University of Technology)

Submission Deadline: September 15, 2011

Invited Contributors: Fred Adams (University of Delaware) & Ken Aizawa (Centenary College of Louisiana), Ronald Giere (University of Minnesota), Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University), Richard Menary (University of Wollongong) and Kim Sterelny (Australian National University and Victoria University).

Background and Aim

According to the thesis of extended cognition, cognitive processes do not need to be located inside the skin of the cognizing agent. Humans routinely engage their wider artifactual environment to extend the capacities of their naked brain. They often rely so much on external aids (notebooks, watches, smartphones) that the latter become a proper part of a hybrid (human-artifact) cognitive system.

The thesis of extended cognition has been influential in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, linguistics, informatics, and ethics, but, surprisingly, not in epistemology. The discipline concerned with one of the most remarkable products of human cognition, viz. knowledge, has largely ignored the suggestion that her main object of study might be produced by processes outside the human skin.

In this special issue of *Philosophical Explorations* we therefore are looking for papers that explore the ramifications of the thesis of extended cognition for contemporary epistemology in general, and for conceptualizations of epistemic action in particular. The special issue will include five invited papers (by Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa, Ronald Giere, Sanford Goldberg, Richard Menary and Kim Sterelny), plus two contributions selected from the papers submitted in response to this open call for papers.

We expect contributions discussing the impact of extended cognition on issues as: epistemic agency and responsibility, cognitive ability, ownership of belief, the distribution of epistemic credit, the sources of belief, artifactual testimony, the growth of knowledge, non-propositional knowledge, the evolution and reliability of extended cognitive processes, the varieties of extended epistemic action.

Submission Details

Please send a pdf-version of your paper (max. 8000 words) to Krist Vaesen. Contributions that do not make it to the special issue may be considered for publication in one of the regular issues of *Philosophical Explorations*.

Further Inquiries

Please direct any inquiries about this call for papers to Krist Vaesen.

The Irrational Faith–Proof, Intuitions, and Religious Belief

“You talk to God, you're religious. God talks to you, you're psychotic.” – Doris Egan

William Lane Craig, popular Christian apologist who has debated almost every prominent atheist and agnostic alive, closed his opening statement in his debate with Oxford professor Peter Atkins with an existential claim. After spending 20 minutes giving rational proofs for God’s existence, he offers a final option if the proofs weren’t convincing.

“The immediate experience of God. This isn’t really an argument for God’s existence. Rather, it’s the claim that you can know that God exists wholly apart from argument simply by immediately experiencing Him. This was the way people in the Bible knew God. As professor John Hick explains, “To them, God was not an idea adopted by the mind but an experiential reality which gave significance to their lives.” Now if this is so then there’s a danger that proofs for God could actually distract your attention from God Himself. If you’re sincerely seeking God, then God will make his existence evident to you. . . . We mustn’t so concentrate on the external proofs that we fail to hear the inner voice of God speaking to our own hearts. For those who listen, God becomes and immediate reality in their lives.” (The Craig-Atkins Debate)

In his book Reasonable Apologetics, Craig appears to take an even harder existentialist line claiming that it is the “Holy Spirit who gives us ultimate assurance of Christianity’s truth” and “reason does not serve as a basis for [the Christian’s] belief.” But he quickly attenuates his view and for those that might claim that reason plays no role, Craig chides, “this attitude is unbalanced and unbiblical” and then spends the majority of his 300 pages providing rational arguments for Christianity and God’s existence.(Craig, 1994)

William_Lane_CraigIn a previous essay, I began looking at the religious existentialism of the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. As we saw there, Kierkegaard would not agree with Craig’s assessment. Kierkegaard’s position is that belief about the existence of God which is based on argument is not belief about any real god. The true Christian is the one that comes to God in “the way people in the Bible knew God,” through a personal, existential encounter. The true God cannot be the conclusion of a syllogism. Yet the both/and approach that Craig calls for typifies the religious epistemology of many Christian believers and the popularity of books and websites on Christian apologetics is at least anecdotal evidence of the desire on the part of believers both that their faith be seen as rational and that they have rational grounds for believing. Can the believer have it both ways?Peter_Atkins

Craig (rightly in my opinion) makes a distinction between belief formed by way of “external” proofs and belief formed by way of direct experience. For Kierkegaard, these two ways are not mutually supporting or compatible when it comes to religion because the object of belief formed by each way is unique. Beliefs arrived at by way of rational evidence have as their object a proposition—an idea. Beliefs formed existentially have as their object the reality the belief is about. Since God is not a proposition but a person, it is not possible to form belief in God by way of reason and actually believe in God qua being. Paul Moser captures this distinction as follows, “If faith that God exists is just belief that God exists, it is merely a psychological attitude towards a judgment or proposition. That is, it is simply de dicto, related to a propositional dictum: to the statement that God exists. In contrast, faith in God is best understood as having a de re component (specifically, involving a relation to something agent-like) that is irreducible to a judgment or proposition. In particular, faith in God relates one to God, and not just to a judgment or proposition about God.” (Moser, 2010) It is similar to a distinction between believing propositions about love and being in love. A woman standing at the altar may take issue if her would-be spouse chose to change the marriage vow to, “Do you promise to fervently believe propositions about love, honoring and cherishing with regards to [fiancée] as long as you both shall live?”

But perhaps this is too rigid a dichotomy. It seems one could encounter a person and have an existential relationship with them but also believe true propositions about them. After all, I know my wife existentially in every way that would satisfy Kierkegaard but I also believe a great number of propositions about her. I know her height, her eye color, her hair color, her movie preferences, how many kids she has, the names of her siblings and the like (I have no idea how much she weighs and she has promised me I’ll never know that fact). The latter beliefs may in some way be based on the former but it certainly seems possible for me to know those facts propositionally while at the same time having a fully existential relationship with her. In fact, many propositional truths are like this. I see (or believe I see) a red object before me and then come to believe the proposition, there is a red object before me. I could then offer evidence and arguments that ground belief in the proposition even though my belief in the red object isn’t grounded on them. Couldn’t religious belief function much like this? One comes to believe in God existentially by directly experiencing him. Then, that belief is supported by a number of rational arguments and physical evidence that essentially provide her with propositional truth about Him.

Moser parts company with Kierkegaard on precisely this point. For Moser, faith is not opposed to reason because an existential commitment can (he argues must) be supported by evidence. He writes,

"In fact, faith in God should be grounded in trustworthy supporting evidence of that distinctive kind in order to avoid becoming just wishful thinking, misleading dogmatism, distorting bias, or some other kind of cognitively arbitrary commitment. Cognitive arbitrariness is harmful in this connection because it leaves faith as unguided by a trustworthy indication of what is true and therefore as a prime candidate for a species of distorting bias or misleading dogmatism. Fideism1 [an epistemic category into which he places Kierkegaard] about faith in God, we shall see, suffers from the deficiency of failing to protect against this serious problem."

"Faith in God therefore should not be characterized as an inward embracing of contradictory or absurdity, because that approach to faith undermines the import and need for supporting evidence of the truth of any proposition accepted and faith.”

He later remarks,

"The receptive feature of faith in God, toward an experienced divine call, arguably excludes a characterization of such faith in terms of pure imagination or wishful thinking, and points instead to a kind of experiential cognitive support. This lesson, if secured, counts directly against fideism, because the lesson portrays faith in God as being responsive to a kind of intervention in human experience that can, and arguably sometimes does, qualify as trustworthy evidence. Exactly what such evidence is evidence of will be, of course, a matter of dispute among philosophers, as pretty much everything else is. Even so, we have a basis for contrasting faith in God with and constraint fantasy or guesswork, and for finding a trustworthy ground for faith in God and the thing(s) two which such faith as a response. This consideration merits our attention as a warning against inflating faith in God with mere belief that God exists. In addition it counts against any kind of fideism (familiar from Kierkegaard, Bultmann, and Barth) that portrays faith in God as irreconcilable with supporting evidence." (Moser, 2010)

To reject evidence for belief in God and view faith, as Kierkegaard does, as absurd is to make faith tangential to the rightly ordered mind. It is to view faith as being in a distinct cognitive category that threatens to lead to distortion, bias, and arbitrariness. As we’ll see later, this is precisely the kind of distinction Kierkegaard wishes to draw in order to illustrate the bright lines between the deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason. One who would seek to ground faith in anything but experiences is not seeking God but something else.

These two specific ways of viewing the relationship between faith and reason capture in general, I believe, the distinction between the Kierkegaardian religious epistemology and the religious epistemology of contemporary believers that wish to preserve the role of reason in religious belief. The latter hold that the deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason not only do complement each other but should complement each other. If they don’t, one or the other must be adjusted until they do (which typically entails fiddling with the rational side of the dichotomy in some fairly dramatic—sometimes amusing—ways). Many existentialists reject this move and certainly Kierkegaard would. Their position is that a belief formed existentially is epistemically isolated from beliefs formed rationally and if an argument proves an existential belief false, so much the worse for the argument. In fact, the argument is irrelevant.

I was faced with a striking example of this recently on the topic of free will. Galen Strawson has developed a powerful argument that human beings cannot be ultimately morally culpable for their actions and thus has devastating consequences for the belief that humans are agents with free will (see my summary of it here). The argument, I think, is fairly conclusive and I don’t believe a rejoinder is forthcoming. Even so, Strawson appears to have intuitions that run counter to the argument. When considering questions about the impact of the argument on our attitudes about praise and blame he writes,

“Taken as a whole, my attitudes on such questions are dramatically inconsistent. For (a) I regard any gifts that I have, and anything good that I do, as a matter of pure good fortune; so that the idea that I deserve credit for them in some strong sense seems absurd. But (b) I find I do not regard others’ achievements and good actions as pure good fortune, but feel admiration (and, where appropriate, gratitude) of a true-responsibility-presupposing kind. Furthermore, (c), I do not regard bad things that I do as mere bad luck, but have true-responsibility-presupposing attitudes to them (which may admittedly fade with time). Finally (d) I do naturally regard bad things that other people do as explicable in ways that make true-responsibility-presupposing blame inappropriate.”(Strawson, 1988)

I would go further than Strawson and admit that, even in light of the argument, it seems to me that I do engage in free acts (acts which appear to me to be entirely under my control and for which I deserve praise or blame). This intuition and “appearance” is extremely strong such that I’ve had to compartmentalize his argument in light of my experience (in other words, I don’t find myself behaving differently towards others nor has my social expectations changed all that much in spite of the argument). But there is clearly a problem here: rationally, I find the notion of free will untenable if I accept the argument but existentially, I find it irresistible. More importantly, (1) if my core intuitions and subsequent behaviors are inconsistent to what I believe to be rationally true, should I consider myself to be deluded or irrational or both? Or (2) should I reject the logic and go with my “common sense,” my intuitions, with what my experience tells me?

I believe Kirerkegaard and many existentialists would answer yes to the second question and while they would agree that such a person is irrational, they would not agree he or she is deluded. They argue that existentially grounded beliefs have no epistemic relation to a belief that a proposition that putatively is about that belief is true. This entails that any evidence or argument that provides rational support for or against the proposition provide no rational support for or against the existential belief. This is because reason itself has no relation to what is existentially known. In the context of the free will question, an existentialist might say that Strawson’s argument has nothing to do with my experience of being a free being. His argument is about something else entirely and as such should have no epistemic or behavioral implications for me as a person in the world.

The distinction between this position and one Craig or even Moser might defend is dramatic and at the core of the current debate over God. The outcome is that a belief formed existentially may strictly be irrational but this has no implications for the epistemic duties of the one holding the belief. Put another way, irrationality in no way counts against the epistemic validity of the existential belief.

In the next essay, we’ll explore why.

Copyright © 2011 Philosophy News Service


  1. Fideism is the view that certain beliefs are not justified on the basis of evidence or argument but by exercising faith that they are true. Philosophers Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach and Basinger use the term “faithism” as an analogue for fideism (see their book Reason and Religious Belief). Fideism is similar to existentialism and some use it as a broad category under which existentialism is placed (I believe Moser does this). I do not believe this is entirely appropriate on specific formulations of fideism but this taxonomy is adequate for the purposes of this essay.

Works cited:

The Craig-Atkins Debate: Evidence For/Against the Existence of God, William Lane Craig and Peter W. Atkins April 1998, Carter Convention Center (Atlanta, Georgia).

Craig, W. L. (1994). Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books., pages 31ff.

Moser, P. K. (2010). The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined. New York: Cambridge University Press., chapter 2

Strawson, G. (1988). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism. Inquiry, 32, 3-27.

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2011 Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Younger Scholars Competition

Dean Zimmerman announces the imminent publication of the winning essay from the 2009 Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Younger Scholars Prize: “Ontological Nihilism”, by Jason Turner (University of Leeds). It will be the lead article in Vol. 6 of OSM, due early 2011 from Oxford University Press. It is also time to remind all the younger metaphysicians out there that the due date for submission to the 2011 competition is fast approaching! It is NOT January 15 (as last OSM reported), but January 30. The winning essay will be published in OSM (often alongside runners-up) and the author receives an $8,000 prize. You still have a whole month in which to prepare your submissions. Get to it!

Full announcement

BSPR 2010 Conference - God, Mind and Knowledge

The British Society for the Philosophy of Religion

2011 Conference: God, Mind and Knowledge

Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford

---Call for Papers---

The next conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion will be at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford from Wednesday 14th - Friday 16th September 2011. The theme for the conference will be God, Mind and Knowledge. The plenary speakers will be John Cottingham, Anthony Kenny, Robin Le Poidevin, and Charles Taliaferro.

If you would like to present a paper, please send an abstract of a maximum of 300 words to Andrew Moore by the end of March.

Papers need not be on the theme of the conference, although a preference may be displayed towards selecting those that are, other things being equal. Obviously time and space at the Conference will be limited, so we shall have to be selective, even allowing for the fact that we plan to run parallel sessions and encourage people presenting papers to keep to half-hour slots.

In order to keep to the tight timetabling required to permit participants to hear (the whole of) as many papers as possible, papers should take ideally fifteen minutes and an absolute maximum twenty minutes to deliver, leaving ten minutes or so for discussion.

Reposted from The Prosblogion

Eighth Annual Formal Epistemology Workshop

We are in the process of organizing our eighth annual formal epistemology workshop. The purpose of these workshops is to bring together faculty and graduate students with an interest in the use of formal methods in epistemology (broadly construed) in small, focused meetings. Topics of interest include (but are not limited to) the following:

• Ampliative inference (including inductive logic);
• Foundations of probability and statistics;
• Epistemic Logics and theories of belief revision;
• Game theory and decision theory (including social choice theory);
• Issues at the interface between formal and traditional epistemology.

The eighth workshop is scheduled for May 19 – 21, 2011 and will be held at the University of Southern California. The website for the workshop is (as usual):

We are now accepting submissions for FEW 2011. Please send submissions by email to Branden Fitelson . Submissions are due — in the form of full papers — by March 1, 2011; notifications of acceptance either as definite presenters or as alternates will be sent out by April 1, 2011. It is likely that some of the papers presented at FEW 2011 will appear in a special issue of the Journal of Philosophical Logic.

In addition to contributed papers, we will also have three keynote lectures. We are delighted to have the following three keynote speakers this year: Mark Colyvan, Chris Hitchcock, and Deborah Mayo.

Those interested in participating in the workshop (e.g., by commenting on a paper or helping with organization, etc.) should contact one of the organizers listed below.

We will be able to contribute $250 in travel funds for each graduate student who presents or comments on a paper. Our funding is limited this year, however, so it is unlikely that we will be able to provide funding for people who are not on the program.

Kenny Easwaran
Shieva Kleinschmidt USC
Branden Fitelson


Reposted from Certain Doubts