Theories of consciousness like dualism and panpsychism often assume that conscious experiences involve acquaintance with mental qualities – qualities wholly internal to the mind. These qualities are supposed to be totally obvious to anyone who introspects, and so part of our “common sense” picture of the mind. Yet, argues Justin Sytsma, people who are untrained in analytic philosophy don’t find these qualities obvious at all. Philosophers of consciousness should therefore beware of making assertions about “common sense” in their arguments, for “common sense” turns out to be a shifting ground, even when the topic is our own mental life. “In attempting to explode the myth I shall probably be taken to be denying well-known facts about the mental life of human beings, and my plea that I aim at doing nothing more than rectify the logic of mental-conduct concepts will probably be disallowed as mere subterfuge.” (Gilbert Ryle, …
Read the full article which is published on IAI TV (external link)
