Part 2: Four Responses to Disagreement
Four Responses to Disagreement
Within the research field of peer disagreement, four main positions have emerged, which correspond to four different reactions that a rational agent can have when finding themselves disagreeing with an epistemic peer.
The Equal Weight View
As noted in Part 1, we are working under the assumption that the two disagreeing parts are similarly, or equally knowledgeable and rational. It therefore seems intuitive to believe that in such a case of disagreement, both opinions have equal weight, and that the disagreement gives both agents a reason to believe they are wrong and that they should revise their belief. This also sometimes is referred to as the Conciliatory View, since it claims that a disagreement between peers should be resolved by choosing the middle position between the two peers’ beliefs. In Part 1 we used the example of Jan and Roos disagreeing over which is the better University to study at. According to the Equal Weight View, if Jan claims that Utrecht University (UU) is better, while Roos claims that Amsterdam’s Vrije Universiteit (VU) is better, then they should settle on both Universities having similarly equal merits and demerits.
It is perhaps the intuitiveness of the Equal Weight View that makes it one of the central topics of discussion in the field of peer disagreement. The other three views developed from some scholars’ discontent with, or doubts about, the Equal Weight View.
The Steadfast View
Some epistemologists argue that there are circumstances under which it is rational to hold on to one’s beliefs, despite the disagreement. Different arguments can motivate this position. However, most of them seem to involve showing that the disagreeing peers were not peers after all, or that the disagreement was not “symmetric.” For example, Jan might possess information that is not available to Roos, or perhaps we have reasons to doubt Roos’ rational capabilities. In these cases, one could argue that Jan is justified in holding on to his belief, despite Roos disagreeing. Even more radically, one might argue that there exist no such things as ideal disagreements and ideal disagreers, even in very abstract scenarios. Alvin Plantinga argues for example that all agents are inevitably fallible.
I will remind the reader, however, that pretty much all social epistemologists agree that if the disagreement is not symmetric, then the option of holding on to one’s beliefs becomes available (see previous section). In this sense, the claim that under certain circumstances one is justified in staying steadfast in their belief is not problematic at all. The debate between Equal Weight View and Steadfast View mostly concerns what these circumstances are, and how much territory previously covered by the Equal Weight View can be taken over by the Steadfast View. Having said this, some epistemologists find both the Equal Weight View and the Steadfast View too simplistic as all-encompassing theories of disagreement.
The Justificationist View
This view originates from the work of Jennifer Lackey and finds itself somewhere in between the two previous views. More specifically, justificationists believe that the debate started from the wrong premises: they argue that one’s reaction to a disagreement should not depend on the status of the disagreement, or of the disagreers, per se, but rather on how justified one was in having the relevant belief before the disagreement itself. In different terms, the disagreement should only lead one to revise their belief if that belief was not well-justified in the first place. Vice versa, if one is highly justified in holding a certain belief, then it does not matter whether someone else agrees or disagrees. Using again the example of Jan and Roos, according to the Justificationist View Roos’ disagreement with Jan should lead Jan to revise his belief only if he did not have good reasons to believe that UU is a better University in the first place.
The Total Evidence View
Finally, we get to the last major position within the field of peer disagreement, which proposes a more overarching theory that attempts to make use of elements from all three previous stances. As the name implies, the advocates of the Total Evidence View propose that one’s response to disagreement should depend on one’s “total evidence.” This includes both “first-order” evidence and “high-order” evidence. The former refers to the evidence available to the disagreeing parts, while the latter refers to the beliefs that the agents form based on the first-order evidence. As we saw earlier, the Equal Weight View traditionally focuses on high-order evidence: if a peer believes that X is right, while the other believes that Z is right, then they should settle for Y.
However, the proponents of the Total Evidence View argue that this is too limited because it focuses solely on the agents’ opinions while leaving out of the picture the evidence on which they base their opinions. A fully rational response to a disagreement should factor in not only opinions about the facts, but also the facts themselves. According to this view, then, Jan and Roos should not settle their disagreement only by compromising their opinions, but also by looking at the actual merits and demerits of UU and VU.
In Part 3 of this series we will see how the debate on the most rational response to disagreement, here sketched out in broad lines, plays out when applied to a specific field. The study case we will use is religion. Part 3 will thus discuss religious disagreement and will start introducing us to the ramifications and broader implications of the debate on disagreement.
You also may be interested in: How to Argue With People
References
Christensen, D. A., & Lackey, J. (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001
Frances, B., & Matheson, J. (2018). Disagreement (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Stanford.edu. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement/
Kelly, T. (2010). Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence. In R. Feldman, & T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
Lackey, J. (2013). What’s the Rational Response to Everyday Disagreements? Philosophers’ Magazine, 59, 101–6.
Matheson, J. (2015). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Springer. Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted Christian belief. Oxford University Press.
Alberto Cavallarin completed a Bachelor Degree in Philosophy at Ca’ Foscari University (Venice, Italy) and a Research Master Degree in Philosophy at Utrecht University (Netherlands). He graduated with a thesis on the metaphysical and epistemological status of mystical experiences; i.e., whether the word “truth” applies to such states. His current interests include (religious) disagreement and non-ordinary experiences.
Email: alberto.cavallarin@hotmail.com
Instagram: @alberto_cavallari
