In debates over mounting political polarization, few concerns are voiced more often than the loss of compromise. The decline of bipartisanship is often treated as both a symptom and a cause of democratic dysfunction—a sign that democracy is becoming more fragile and divided. Despite consistent public support for leaders willing to meet in the middle, meaningful compromises between political opponents are increasingly hard to come by.

These concerns are familiar enough. What is less often explained is why a decline in political compromise is bad for democracy. In fact, many people simply assume that compromise is essential to democratic politics, so that the growing unwillingness of politicians to work with their political rivals is treated as an obvious case of democratic dysfunction.

One explanation for this assumption may be that much of the discussion about polarization focuses on the United States. In the U.S., the Senate filibuster and the President’s veto make it incredibly challenging to pass major legislation without at least some cross-party agreement. But the fact that a lack of compromise creates problems for the American democratic system doesn’t mean that it is a threat to democracy as such. The Westminster model found in places like the United Kingdom and Canada, for instance, traditionally gives the winning party a large majority and leaves the runner-up with little power to block or challenge legislation.

It is possible then to have democracy without much compromise between political rivals. The more fundamental question is whether there is anything troubling about this way of doing democracy? Or in other words, do we have democratic reasons to compromise with our political opponents, even when we are in the majority? I want to suggest that such reasons are not as universal as many people assume and that a lack of compromise might not be so troubling for democracy.

So, what reasons might we have to compromise? An initial thought is that compromise might support democratic stability. When winners make concessions, they reduce the cost of losing elections, making it easier for the losing side to accept defeat. Compromise can also make policies legitimate in the eyes of more people, improving political outcomes. But these are instrumental reasons—they justify compromise only when it achieves those benefits. If stability and compliance are already strong, or can be secured by other means, then we no longer need to compromise.

In fact, refusing to compromise can sometimes strengthen democracy. Stability depends not only on the willingness of losers to accept results, but also on the ability of winners to carry out the policies they promised at election time. Too much compromise can make government appear unresponsive, and it can blur accountability, making it harder for voters to know who is responsible for which decisions.

Perhaps it is not the consequences of compromise which are important. Instead, compromise may be desirable because it expresses some deeper democratic value, such as equality between citizens. On this view, we should compromise with opponents because it shows respect for them as our political equals, whose views and concerns deserve consideration alongside our own.

But it’s not clear that compromise is necessary to treat others as equals. If everyone can vote, campaign, and debate freely, and if we listen and respond to one another’s arguments sincerely, then equality is already being respected—without the need for compromise. Democracy itself enshrines equality between citizens, so why must we go further?

Real democracies are far from perfectly equal, of course. Wealth and privilege give some people more political power than others, while the more articulate or confident can often dominate public debate. The philosopher Daniel Weinstock therefore argues that compromise can serve a remedial role. By giving something to those who lost at election time, we help to correct for unequal advantages in the democratic process and recognize that our victories may not have been entirely fair to begin with.

Seen in this way, compromise does seem to have democratic value—it serves as a way of compensating for political inequality. But this still doesn’t justify a general willingness to compromise with anyone and everyone. Instead, it only gives us reason to compromise with those who are politically disadvantaged, and we may refuse to compromise with those in positions of strength, since doing so could make politics even more unequal.

There is another problem as well: compromise itself can reflect inequality. The ability to reach successful agreements depends on one’s connections and relationships—what is often called “social capital”—advantages which are not shared evenly. If these inequalities mirror existing disparities, then a general push to compromise could end up reinforcing unfairness rather than reducing it. So, while we may have egalitarian reasons to compromise, we should do so selectively and cautiously.

An alternative democratic value which may support compromise is the idea of collective rule. Political theorist Christian Rostbøll argues that compromise expresses respect for others as co-rulers—as fellow participants in shaping the laws we all live under. It allows those who lost at the ballot box to still influence final decisions and have their ideas reflected in laws and policies.

Again, however, this seems to support compromise in some cases but not very widely. This is because it applies best to “permanent minorities”—groups that rarely, if ever, win elections. For parties like the Libertarians or Greens in the U.S., compromise may be the only way to see their views represented in political outcomes. But for major parties that regularly alternate in power, such as the Democrats and Republicans, the democratic case for compromise is much weaker. Over time, these groups already have ample opportunities to shape the content of law and policy.

What, then, does all this mean for political polarization? While polarization poses real dangers to democracy, we should be cautious about treating a lack of compromise as one of them. A more polarized politics often involves less cooperation, but democracy does not require a constant eagerness to give ground to one’s opponents. What it requires is that we compromise wisely—at the right times, for the right reasons, and in ways that serve democratic values. A mature democracy may sometimes require less compromise, not more.

Editor’s note: This is an extra edition of the Perspectives on Democracy series for November 2025.

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