““Objectivity” in the first sense was a property of theories which, having been thoroughly discussed, are chosen by a consensus of rational discussants. By contrast, a “subjective” consideration is one which has been, or would be, or should be, set aside by rational discussants — one which is seen to be, or should be seen to be, irrelevant to the subject matter of the theory. […] For a consideration to be subjective, in this sense, is simply for it to be unfamiliar. So judging subjectivity is as hazardous as judging relevance. In a more traditional sense of “subjective,” on the other hand, “subjective” contrasts with “corresponding to what is out there,” and thus means something like “a product only of what is in here” […] In this sense “subjective” is associated with “emotional” or “fantastical,” for our hearts and our imaginations are idiosyncratic, while our intellects are, at their best, identical mirrors of the self-same external objects. […] The various ambiguities of “objective” and “subjective” illustrate the way in which the confusion can develop. If it were not for the traditional linkage of these distinctions, a historian of inquiry who emphasized similarities between the controversies of scientists and those of literary critics would not have been construed as endangering our minds by upgrading our hearts.”

– Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature