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The splitting of the human being into two qualitatively distinct dimensions is a constant in practically the entire Western philosophical tradition. One is sensitivity, which is linked to the body, emotions, and all those traits that bring us closer to animality. The other one is the reason, an intellectual dimension detached from the corporeal, constituting the distinctive feature of the human being, that is, what separates and places us above other animals. These two dimensions are not only different but ontologically antagonistic. They express all the contrasts that have accompanied us throughout the history of Western thought (material-immaterial, body-mind, feeling-thinking, being-ought-to-be, etc.). Consequently, it is unsurprising that each of these dimensions has different demands on the human being.
Sensitivity is the representative of uniqueness and the representative of its demands. If we have individual preferences for a certain place or person, it is because our sensitivity has made it so, since emotions, sensations, and experiences make us prefer some things over others, they make us prioritize the world and carry out a valuation of it that emanates from our uniqueness. On the contrary, the reason it appeals to the universal, to the conceptual, which detaches itself from singularities to the abstract realm, here the differences established by sensitivity become indifferent. Sensitivity deals with differentiated singularities and reason with self-identical concepts.
But precisely that technical form that reveals truth to the intellect obscures it, on the other hand, from feeling; for it is a sad condition of intelligence to have to break down the object of inner sense in order to appropriate it…In order to grasp the transitory phenomenon, it must imprison it in the meshes of the general rule, strip beautiful bodies into concepts, and preserve the living spirit in a shabby skeleton of words (1) .
We live, therefore, in a constant tension between sensibility’s demand for singularity and difference, and reason’s demand for universality and homogeneity. Within this framework, the philosopher Schiller focuses not so much on considering a possible independent functioning of rationality with respect to sensibility, as we find in Kant and his pure reason, but rather on elucidating a possible harmony between the two, since if we succumb exclusively to only one of these dimensions, we will face terrible consequences.
If we give ourselves exclusively to reason and let it shape the world, establishing the most rational order possible, we will collapse into what Schiller calls barbarism. Reason would only leave us with a world without friends, children, or family; without any distinction between human beings, we would only have the concept of “human being.” It would leave us with a world without special or sacred places, only with geometric spatial extensions; we would experience a world without important dates, only with the arithmetic passage of time; we would live, ultimately and ironically, in a world uninhabitable for our sensibilities, where everything is something ordinary: a human being, an extension, a period…because what makes an ordinary person loved is the affection; the love that, from my individual sensitivity, I have for them. What makes a few square meters my childhood living room is the unique experiences I lived and felt there. What makes an ordinary period become a day to celebrate, for example, because I managed to get into the university program I wanted, is the joy and satisfaction that this news brought me.
And so, little by little, concrete life is extinguished so that the abstractness of the whole can prolong its diminished existence (2).
However, giving ourselves to sensitivity would lead us to what philosophers call savagery, where we would be unable to equate in any sense the multiplicity of singularity. Everything would be constituted by differences and individual preferences. It would be impossible to establish something like universal principles or rights and duties since this would imply the equalization of all individuals in some sense so that all were dependent on these principles, rights, and duties equally; thus, the foundation of the latter is none other than the abstract and universal notion of being human. But whenever, through our reason, we use a concept, we must be careful not to become too attached to it, because we can end up falling in love with the concept of humanity without ever loving a single human being. How many attempts have been made to justify the harm inflicted on individuals by arguing that it benefited humanity as a concept?
To avoid falling into excesses of either sensitivity or reason, Schiller proposes an aesthetic education that administers justice between these two tendencies that lay on us: the formal impulses of reason and the sensitive impulses of the body. It may seem strange to appeal to aesthetics for this task; however, since Baumgarten, this discipline has focused on the intermediate region that mediates between sensitivity and reason, addressing the connection between the two. Therefore, Schiller recognizes the relevance of aesthetics when it comes to educating our feelings and our reasoning, with the aim of achieving a cultured man, a cultured humanity where sensitivity and reason are harmoniously intertwined.
If the victorious force of truth has been so little manifested until now, it is not because the understanding has not been able to discover it, but because the heart has been deaf to its voice and the impulse has been reluctant to work for it (3).
Sensitivity must be educated to broaden our feelings, that is, to be able to feel in the place of others and thus achieve a kind of common sensitivity; in a certain sense, we already have small communities configured in our way of feeling. For example, we find certain common sensibilities within states: consider the European Championship held last summer, in whose matches members of the same nation suffered or rejoiced together, depending on how their soccer team fared in the game: they shared a common feeling. Schiller doesn’t want to expand sensitivity to the limits of the nation; rather, he advocates expanding it without any limits, aspiring to achieve a universality in our way of feeling. That is, to be capable of feeling in the place of any other; this way, sensitivity adjusts to the demand for the universality of reason. Only then will we be able to detach sensitivity from mere individual preferences; by being able to feel in someone else’s shoes, we ensure that one’s happiness is not disconnected from that of others.
Reason, as well, must also be educated so that it does not stray from its legitimate use. It offers us the objective framework, the demand for universality, to which we must elevate sensitivity, this is what is all about: the sensible part of us can companion the rational demand, not to crush the claims of sensitivity. We seek, therefore, a union where sensitivity moves us to what reason desires without needing to be forced by the last one; and for this, a broadening of the way we feel is necessary. In a world that increasingly narrows our sensitivity, reducing it to the feeling of oneself, Schiller urges us to expand that feeling so it can reach the demand for universality that our reason always presents to us. If we manage to be capable of feeling in the place of someone else, then we will be able to heal that wound that has plagued us for centuries: the one opened between sensation and thought.
The way that leads to intellect must be open by the heart (4).
[1] Schiller, F. (1920). The Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters: Letter I, p. 11.
[2] Ibidem: letter VI, p. 33.
[3] Ibidem: letter VII, p. 42.
[4] Ibidem: letter VIII, page. 44.
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