Globally, democracy is on a downward curve. According to the latest V‑Dem Institute report, the world has fewer democracies than autocracies for the first time in over two decades, with liberal democracy being the least common regime type. Also, countries that move in an autocratic direction by far outnumber countries that move in a democratic direction, and autocratization is to a large extent driven by populous and economically powerful countries more capable of exerting influence on the world than smaller and less powerful countries. The democratic decline is substantial, and it does not seem to slow down.

This worrying development illustrates the importance of ongoing debates on democratic self-defense, concerning how democracies can protect themselves from anti-democratic forces. Central to these debates is the idea of a militant democracy, an idea often traced back to Karl Loewenstein (1891–1973). Writing in a period where fascism was on the rise, Loewenstein urged democrats to leave democratic fundamentalism behind and step up to militancy. When authoritarian movements and organizations seek to subvert democracy by democratic means, democrats cannot remain passively tolerant, but must be ready to limit certain forms of political activity by legal means. Accordingly, Loewenstein defended the various forms of anti-fascist legislation found throughout interwar Europe, such as prohibitions against party militias and antidemocratic parties, restrictions on the freedoms of speech and assembly, and the establishment of political police.

While contemporary debates are dominated by a similar focus on legal restrictions on rights to freedom of expression and political participation, critics of militant democracy have questioned the coherence of defending democracy in such ways. Some find that militant provisions contradict the normative logic of democracy because of an inherent arbitrariness in any decision as to who is an enemy of democracy. Others find that the justification of militant provisions rests on elitist assumptions that conflict with egalitarian democratic ideals.

While these criticisms identify problematic aspects in Loewenstein’s account, it is less clear that they rule out the possibility of normatively coherent forms of militant democracy. As Jan-Werner Müller points out, there is at least an important difference between banning parties organized for the purpose of abolishing democracy and stripping someone completely of rights to political participation. The latter comes close to doing the job for the antidemocrat, whereas the former is consistent with recognizing that the antidemocrat too has legitimate claims on the political system. Softer measures are also available. For instance, instead of prohibiting parties, one can allow parties to exist while denying them the right to register for elections.

Still, there are good reasons for avoiding a one-sided focus on legal measures that limit core democratic rights when discussing what can be done to protect democratic institutions. For one thing, there is the worry that militant approaches to democratic self-defense might be counterproductive. Loewenstein spoke of fighting fire with fire. But given that the electoral success of autocratic populists to a considerable degree rests on a perceived cleavage between the people and a corrupt elite, it is not unlikely that party bans and restrictions on free speech would instead add fuel to the fire. Moreover, once militant measures become relevant, it seems that things have already gone too far. Then we are in a place where we should not want to be. And the question we should ask is: How can we avoid getting there?

In recent years, an alternative approach, sometimes called the social model of democratic self-defense, has emerged. This is an approach that draws on social-democratic thinking, and that emphasizes the need to make democratic polities more resilient through socio-economic means. It rests on the idea that lack of social justice and equality is an important part of the underlying problem that leads to radicalization and increased support for authoritarian populist movements. For this reason, its advocates defend a wide range of redistributive policies that can empower citizens and provide social security, which in turn might soften conflicts and foster solidarity.

Empirical studies on democracy and economic inequality support some of the basic assumptions of the social model. Not only does concentration of wealth translate into disproportionate influence over lawmaking processes, but increased inequality also comes along with declining trust in democratic institutions. These findings indicate that the vast inequalities characterizing contemporary societies both hinder fair exercise of political power and threaten to corrode the social basis of democracy.

The strategy proposed by advocates of the social model is to act pre-emptively, countering the social dynamic at the root of the problem that militant democrats respond to. The idea is to defend democracy by securing socio-economic conditions that enable democratic participation on fair terms. In this way, one intends to strengthen democratic resilience without compromising core democratic principles.

However, using social and economic policies as pre-emptive self-defense has been criticized for resting on elitist assumptions similar to those found in Loewenstein’s work. According to the critique, the social-democratic approach regards certain citizens as less than full political agents capable of forming sound political judgements. The charge is that one not only assumes these citizens to hold problematic beliefs, but also that their beliefs are merely the product of external socio-economic conditions, rather than their own political reasoning. And if this criticism is valid, justifying redistribution as a form of democratic self-defense seems to conflict with the egalitarian ideals motivating the social model in the first place. Although these ideals do not make rational consensus a requirement of democratic legitimacy, they imply that justifications of policy choices must be compatible with recognition of all citizens as autonomous persons capable of assessing and responding to arguments in a rational way.

In response to this objection, I would like to make two points. First, to assume that extreme inequality makes society vulnerable to antidemocratic forces is not to say that some citizens lack rational capacities. It is simply to assume that we all can be swayed in non-rational ways, and that today’s rising inequality makes us less resistant to autocratic demagoguery. These assumptions are compatible with recognizing everyone’s capacity to deliberate and form opinions based on rational arguments. Hence, there need be nothing elitist in considering causal factors affecting the way people think when making political decisions.

And this leads to the second point, which is that sustaining democratic institutions is a legitimate and mandatory concern of elected officials. Without a properly designed system of political and legal institutions, there can be no democracy. For this reason, those entrusted with political power are obliged to take responsibility for upholding such a system. Ignoring factors that threaten its stability would at best be negligent.

Accordingly, taking a pre-emptive approach to democratic self-defense seems appropriate. While a militant approach focused on legal restrictions on political activity can be important, we should not suspend action until militant measures are imperative. We also need to work actively towards a more just and resilient democratic system.

The latter certainly requires more than addressing the problem of economic inequality. One issue that immediately comes to mind is civic education that makes citizens capable of participating constructively in democratic processes. Another pressing issue is regulating digital platforms to curb disinformation and better facilitate rational public debate. But none of this should divert us from confronting how economic conditions and the distribution of wealth in contemporary society negatively affect democracy. A strategy for preventing further democratic setbacks must be comprehensive. It must attend to a wide range of challenges, and inequality does not seem to be the least important of these challenges.

Editor’s note: This is an extra edition of the Perspectives on Democracy series for December 2025.

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