We all have items of sentimental value—whether it’s a pebble picked up on the beach, a souvenir magnet from a trip abroad, or a set of inherited tableware from a great-grandmother. Such items often have little monetary worth, limited usefulness, and—let’s be honest—are sometimes even ugly. This helps clarify at least what sentimental value is not: it is distinct from monetary, instrumental (in a straightforward sense), and aesthetic value. While some sentimental items may be expensive, useful, or beautiful, this is not what makes them sentimental. Yet sentimental objects are among people’s most important belongings. One way to see it, as used in one of the few studies about sentimental value, is through the “house in fire scenario”: imagine that your house is about to be destroyed by fire; everyone is safe but you only have the time to save three items (assuming that size doesn’t matter). What would you save? Of course, people tend to think a lot about practical items (papers, money, computer), but about a third of the answers are sentimental items: photos, gifts, heirlooms, etc. Despite the apparent major role of sentimental value in our lives, very few philosophers have been interested in it. Understanding better what sentimental value is and how it relates to other categories of values would provide insightful ideas for many domains, such as axiology, philosophy of action, emotions, metaethics, or even aesthetics.

So, what makes an object sentimentally valuable? Clearly, it is not due to the object’s intrinsic properties but to some of its extrinsic properties. For instance, my grandmother’s necklace has sentimental value to me because of the extrinsic fact that it was hers, and not because of its material, color, or design—the same necklace would not have sentimental value if I happened to find it in a shop. Guy Fletcher identifies several such extrinsic properties, such as: “having belonged to, having been given to or by, or having being used by, people or animals, within a relationship of family, friendship, or romantic love.” This highlights the fact that sentimental objects seem linked to people we love. In the philosophy of emotions, love is often considered as a kind of dispositional attitude (or “sentiment,” in this more technical sense). Accordingly, to love someone involves being disposed to feel joy, tenderness, or thrill when the person is around, sadness or anxiety when they are in a bad situation, to act in the beloved’s interests, to positively evaluate situations that favor their well-being, and so on. At this point, it is unclear whether sentimental objects could be tied to other positive sentiments towards a person—admiration, for instance, might be a candidate.

However, some sentimental items don’t seem to bear a connection to any person. This is the case, for instance, of the souvenirs we bring back from trips. What seems most important here is that such items remind us of precious memories. This suggests that there might be two kinds of sentimental objects: those reminding us of a memory, and those reminding us of a special person or relationship (following the distinction made by Yang & Galak). Whether these two kinds can merge into a unifying phenomenon is yet to be determined (one option could be that sentimental value reminds us of things important to us more generally). In any case, whether a precious memory involves a person or not seems optional.

Once we recognize this second category, the role of sentiments becomes less clear. Do we “love” our memories? The emotional aspect of such sentimental items can be found in different places. First, it might be sufficient that such memories involve people we love. Second, precious memories without people that we love are most of the time emotionally charged, such as feeling happiness, pride, or joy for a graduation, a wedding, the birth of a child, or a personal achievement. Therefore, it seems that we might need to broaden our scope to emotions more generally and not just sentiments. However, while some events are emotionally charged at the moment they happen, others seem to acquire emotional significance only in retrospect. Consider, for instance, objects associated with former periods of one’s life: a former house, a former neighborhood, or former daily routines often become deeply sentimental, even if they were emotionally neutral at the time. This apparently constitutes a third “emotional scenario”: here, the emotions or sentiments attached to the memory are not part of the original event but emerge through one’s later reflection on one’s life. In each case, one becomes emotionally attached to an object and its associated memory, but when and toward what the emotion must be felt remains unsure.

Although sentimental objects are not instrumentally valuable in the sense of fulfilling their designated function (e.g., a sentimentally valuable broken watch), they have instrumental value in the sense of reminding us of important memories or relationships. They might provide us pleasure by re-experiencing the positive emotions associated. Nonetheless, some deeply sentimental objects might be associated with negative emotions (e.g., if they remind us of a deceased loved one). Rather than discarding the idea that sentimental objects have instrumental value, we should recognize that they can serve functions beyond pleasure: such sentimental objects may be identity-shaping, and they may help us to understand ourselves, to remind us what is important or what has meaning for us.

Another interesting consideration (at least for axiologists) is whether sentimental objects might have final value, i.e., value for its own sake and not as a means to something else. Although the concept of final value is still very debated, one popular option states that x has final value if and only if it is fitting to finally value x (i.e., to value it as an end in itself). This conception seems to match our common practices: we do not treat sentimental objects as means to pleasure or meaning; we seem to value them for themselves. While I agree with this observation, one question remains: is it really fitting to value such items for their own sake? Levi Tenen provides us with a useful answer: “There can be a reason to value objects for their own sakes given their extrinsic relations, where such reasons have their source in the warranted love or admiration for the related person.” We can assume that this account could be extended to memories without people and other emotions.

However, not only does it fail to account for sentimental objects that are not tied to persons, but it also leads to objectionable consequences. Consider Jeanne, an overly sentimental person who attaches sentimental value to things that it is not fitting for her to value; for instance, because she loves someone in a disproportionate way or someone who is morally reprehensible. According to Tenen, we must say that these items, despite being so important to Jeanne and reminding her of precious memories, do not have sentimental value (since it is not fitting for her to value them). This is not merely a hypothetical case—many of us might already be “Jeannes” in the way we accumulate boxes of old, broken items of another time for sentimental reasons. In this respect, sentimental value appears deeply subjective. The way sentimental items are so important for us and idiosyncratic makes it a challenge for value theorists. Yet, few philosophers have studied this topic, leaving many considerations about sentimental value largely unexplored.

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