This syllabus is designed for a course that introduces students to some issues in the philosophy of language. There are seven-ish units to the course:

1. Free speech (Mill, Hornsby, Brison)
2. Speech Acts (MacDonald, Austin, Strawson, Millikan)
3. Implicature (Grice and Saul)
4. Names for Fictional Characters (Thomasson and Sainsbury)
5. Names Part 1 (Frege, Russell, Jones)
6. Names Part 2 (Stebbing, Marcus, Kripke)
7. Indeterminacy of Translation (Quine, Davidson, Searle)

There are many other readings within these topics or themes that I could pick and many other topics or themes that one could pick (suggestions welcomed at my inbox). Whatever I have to say on that subject is something that you have probably heard before. So I won’t waste your time about that (but beware if you email me about it—you have been warned…).

Instead, let me highlight what I think this syllabus does well in achieving some of my learning objectives (these are underlined in the paragraphs below):

1. Rather abstract (“dry”) topics are motivated by a preceding unit that sparks great conversation. Defenses and criticisms of free speech (in the American context) lead naturally into speech acts and understanding that “mere speech” is a very troublesome appellation (especially when we take stock of implicatures, as occurs in misleading someone). Issues for naming fictional objects lead quite naturally to the nature of names. Students (philosophy majors or not) entering the class with less prior investment in the philosophy of language can equally appreciate where we are headed in the middle of the abstract unit because we had an engaging and fun discussion about free speech or names for fictional characters right before exploring more “dry” papers. 
2. Non-majors who often take philosophy courses have something to spark their interest and that they can bring their background to bear upon. Pre-law majors, political science majors, or law school-bound students can mention Supreme Court decisions that they have studied. English students can bring to bear examples from works of fiction that they are reading. Anthropology and sociology students have often heard about the indeterminacy of translation without having read the primary texts in this syllabus. Readings of interdisciplinary interest afford students a chance to bring their personal interests and prior knowledge to bear on the philosophical texts.
3. Students critically engage with some ongoing issues in the history of philosophy that bear on their course’s syllabus. This learning objective arises out of my research interests in the history of analytic philosophy, so let me explain that context a bit more. I have argued in print that canons are dogmatic in an anti-philosophical manner that is uncharacteristic for philosophers—even contrary to the discipline’s prevailing methods and Socratic starting points. Some philosophers (including some of whose works I have had the pleasure to publish in a volume that I have co-edited with Alexander Klein) argue (I think rightly) that certain philosophical ideas were anticipated (if not outright discovered earlier) by women who subsequently were neglected in favor of male successors. If so, then this has a direct bearing on how courses present “classical” ideas in the philosophy of language like speech act, rigid designator, and sense-reference.
   Since I think the debate over these matters should be foregrounded in the course (and not ended by pedagogical fiat before the course has even begun), the syllabus here has students critically engage with their own course syllabus and why it has these readings and in this order. This is done by pairing women in philosophy who arguably anticipated “classical” ideas with male philosophers who generally get the credit for said ideas. Readings within each unit proceed in chronological order from the piece’s date of publication. Assignments also often have a question that invites students to discuss critically whether these pairings are sensible or not, whether so-and-so should get credit (or not, or share it). Specific pairings used here are as follows:

1. MacDonald is the first author in the speech act theory unit given that her discussion of ritualistic language in ethics anticipates some of Austin’s work on speech acts.
2. Jones is paired with Frege given the similarities of their solutions to the “Morning Star”—“Evening Star” puzzle about names. 
3. Marcus is paired with Kripke, given the similarly non-descriptivist accounts of names and given both their importance in establishing quantified modal logic.

Here is an example of an assignment question that invites students into our scholarly conversation over the history of philosophy (as it bears on their philosophy of language course):

Discuss critically the fact that Jones’ and Frege’s solutions to the puzzle about names are similar. What are the differences between their views? What, if anything, does the widespread focus on Frege and the widespread neglect of Jones say about the contributions of women in philosophy? 

Note that their grade has nothing to do with whether they answer the question here affirmatively or negatively. As I said, there is an ongoing discussion about such issues among historians of philosophy. Students are being invited here to participate in our scholarly conversation (as it directly impacts and relates to their course syllabus), not affirm whatever view I have on the matter (nor whatever view their prior views may have naturally inclined them towards before they read any of the authors involved).

As an aside, I’ve tried, but students struggle with Jones’ Elements of Logic and similar pieces from the 1890s if they haven’t taken symbolic logic—Jones is mainly concerned with teaching or else assumes (syllogistic) logic there—and I don’t wish to make symbolic logic a pre-requisite to the course. So this syllabus includes a later Jones piece—the preceding Frege reading and the fact that this piece is light on actually helps them identify what Jones is up to—but discuss in-class the arguable priority of Jones in solving the puzzle about names (given that her solution is published by 1890). 

I close with two reminders. First, this syllabus is designed to meet specific learning objectives that I have, and is in no way a criticism or recommendation to others who may have different pedagogical aims. Second, it is a work in progress—every time I teach, my syllabus changes more than I expect it to—so comments, criticisms (I am sure there is fair criticism to be made), and suggestions are welcome.

“Here I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task.—May others come and do it better.” – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Preface)

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