Podcast episode 38: Interview with Dan Everett on C.S. Peirce and Peircean linguistics

Date

March 31, 2024

source

In this interview, we talk to Dan Everett about the life and work of the American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and Everett’s application of Peirce’s ideas to create a Peircean linguistics.

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References for Episode 38

Cole, David. 2023. “The Chinese Room Argument”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/chinese-room/

Everett, Daniel L. 2012. Language: The Cultural Tool. New York: Pantheon Books.

Everett, Daniel L. 2017. How Language Began: The Story of Humanity’s Greatest Invention. New York: Liveright.

Everett, Daniel L. 2023. ‘Underspecified temporal semantics in Pirahã: Compositional transparency and semiotic inference’, in Understanding Human Time, ed. Kasia M. Jaszczolt, pp. 276–318. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Transcript by Luca Dinu

JMc: Hi, I’m James McElvenny, and you’re listening to the History and Philosophy of the Language Sciences podcast, [00:15] online at hiphilangsci.net. There you can find links and references to [00:19] all the literature we discuss. Today we’re joined by Dan Everett. Dan is Professor [00:25] of Cognitive Sciences at Bentley College in Massachusetts. His background is in field [00:31] linguistics and linguistic theory, and he’s of course best known for his work with the [00:37] Pirahã in the Brazilian Amazon. The conclusions he’s drawn about the structure of the Pirahã [00:43] language have significant consequences for much of mainstream linguistic theory, especially [00:49] for generative grammar in the Chomskyan tradition. These consequences have been debated extensively. [00:56]

At the moment, Dan is researching most keenly the life and work of the American philosopher [01:01] Charles Sanders Peirce. This project is not unrelated to his work on Pirahã and his previous [01:08] contributions to linguistic theory. These various threads are now coming together in Dan’s proposal [01:15] for a Peircean linguistics, and this is what he’s going to talk to us about today.

So to set the [01:22] scene for us, can you tell us, who was C.S. Peirce? What were his intellectual contributions, [01:29] and why are they important?

DE: I’m actually writing a biography of Charles Sanders Peirce for [01:35] Princeton University Press, and I’ve been interested in Peirce now for about six years [01:42] seriously, and before that I did cite him quite a bit in my How Language Began from 2017 and [01:51] also in my Language: The Cultural Tool from 2012, but I got seriously interested in Peirce [01:59] some years later. The first time I heard about Peirce, and then I’ll get to who he is, was [02:05] actually from Chomsky, who called him his favorite philosopher and talked about the [02:10] Peircean concept of abduction, which is the formalization of hypothesis formation. [02:16]

Charles Peirce was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to Benjamin and Sarah Peirce in 1839. [02:26] Benjamin was for 50 years professor of mathematics at Harvard and was considered the leading [02:33] mathematician in the United States and the person who put U.S. science on a nearly equal footing [02:41] with the European science of mid-19th century, and he was a very interesting person in his own [02:47] right, founder of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Association for the Advancement [02:53] of Science, co-founder.

Charles was raised in Harvard Yard. When he was a boy, they lived [03:02] actually in Harvard Yard, and his friends and his father’s friends were some of the leading [03:07] intellectuals of the United States, and later as Peirce grew, his own friends became leading [03:15] intellectuals and friends of people such as Thomas Huxley and others.

But Charles initially became [03:23] interested in logic and chemistry, and for most of his life… The only degree that he actually ever held [03:33] was in chemistry. He held a master’s degree and a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from [03:41] Harvard, and he was then hired as an astronomer and as a geophysicist with what was then called [03:51] the U.S. Coastal Survey, which is now NOAA. They actually launched a ship called C.S. Peirce. [03:59] So he got mainly interested in logic, but he was also one of the greatest polymaths in history. He [04:07] was the first person in the United States to do experimental psychology. He was the inventor of [04:15] propositional and first-order logic with quantifiers, nearly simultaneously with Frege. [04:20] They didn’t know about each other’s work. Peirce is also known as the inventor of American pragmatism, [04:26] or just pragmatism. That’s a philosophical school of America that is often associated with [04:30] William James. He is the inventor of semiotics, and there’s evidence that Saussure actually [04:38] was able to consult some of Peirce’s work on semiotics before he came out with his own work [04:44] on semiotics, which was very different and designed for a very different purpose. [04:51]

So in mathematics, Peirce took his father’s place as the number one mathematician in the United [04:57] States, and there are many articles on mathematics. So he was a phenomenal polymath. He was one of the [05:03] leading Egyptologists in the world, and he was… In his notebooks I have copied, there are analyses of [05:12] Tagalog syntax, and he was very interested in languages. He published about 127 articles on [05:21] linguistics or linguistic themes, including the first-ever phonetic study of Shakespearean [05:27] pronunciation. His father had produced the first formal study of phonetics in the United States, [05:33] or one of the first.

So he was this astounding person, but when he died, [05:40] he never held an academic post except for four years at Johns Hopkins. He was one of the first [05:46] professors hired at the new University of Johns Hopkins, but Peirce was a very egocentric person. [05:54] He thought he was smarter than everybody else. He probably was. He didn’t like to take orders. [05:59] So he lost his job at Johns Hopkins. Also from the fact that he liked to drink, and he was seen [06:06] coming out of a hotel with a woman who was not his wife, and that really got the trustees of [06:11] Johns Hopkins upset. He eventually married her. But he was fired. He was eventually fired from [06:17] his job at the U.S. Coastal Service after 31 years, and this was in the day before pensions, [06:22] before retirement plans.

So he was left penniless when he was roughly 60 years old, 62 years old. [06:31] He was left penniless and survived through the contributions of William James, who led a great [06:39] effort to round up people from Alexander Graham Bell to Andrew Carnegie to contribute monthly [06:46] to Peirce. But it was very pov… It was a poverty-level contribution, but it kept him from death, I mean, [06:53] and starvation.

Peirce, according to his diaries, was usually up at 7:30 in the morning and worked [06:59] till about midnight or 1 AM every day, seven days a week, and his neighbors said that the light [07:05] was always on in his study, and poverty did not keep him from working a tremendous amount. [07:11]

His papers originally were not well organized after his death. They were picked up and sold [07:17] for a very small price to Harvard, and Harvard took them and tried to organize them, but because [07:23] of his reputation for immorality, in part, Harvard wouldn’t allow access to those papers, [07:30] and so it was very hard to do work on Peirce. And one of the chairmen of the Harvard philosophy [07:36] department who had the control over the papers was Willard Van Orman Quine, who would not let [07:41] anyone see them. So it wasn’t until the work of Max Fisch and Paul Weiss and others that the [07:52] papers began to become organized and that we began to get access to them. Max Fisch worked for [07:59] 50 years on a Peirce biography that he never started, but he took over 70,000 notes on Peirce [08:08] and did a huge amount of historical research, and I have all of those on my computer now. [08:12] I made an effort to get to where they’re located in Indiana and copy them. So Peirce, in my opinion, [08:19] offers an exciting alternative to current views of linguistics, which, in my opinion, even if one [08:29] does not ultimately decide that they want to work within a Peircean linguistics, I think they will [08:36] find his ideas extremely interesting and relevant, even if they continue to work in the same model. [08:43]

JMc: So can I just ask you there, obviously he worked in pretty much every field of intellectual [08:49] endeavor, but you say he was the inventor of modern semiotics?

DE: Yes, Peirce was the inventor [08:56] of semiotics. He certainly wasn’t the first person to talk about the semeion and signs. [09:01] That goes back… You know, there’s great work on that by Sextus Empiricus, there’s work by [09:08] John Locke, and many others worked on signs, but Peirce was the first one to develop a formal [09:14] theory of semiotics. He actually saw logic as a branch of semiotics. And the big difference [09:20] between Peircean semiotics and other semiotics, such as Saussure’s, is that whereas Saussure’s, [09:27] for example, was dyadic — there was a form-meaning composite, which is what most linguists are used to; [09:36] you have a word “dog,” its form is d-o-g in English, and it means “canine,” “domesticated canine” — [09:44] but for Peirce, there were three components to any sign. There was the sign itself (the physical [09:51] form, which he called the representamen), there was the object of the sign (which was very crucial, [09:57] so “tree” has an object, this thing in nature), and there’s also the interpretant. Every sign [10:03] has to be interpreted by another sign. We can’t think without signs; we can’t talk without signs; [10:09] every sign needs another sign. So if I paraphrase what a tree is, I would still be using other [10:17] signs to interpret that sign. So in this sense, also for Peirce, semiotics is recursive. One sign [10:24] is interpreted by another sign, which is interpreted by another sign, so it’s signs all the way down. [10:29]

So that makes Peirce’s signs very different, and he developed a very elaborate system of signs. [10:35] The three most common signs for people who aren’t specialists in semiotics are the icon, [10:41] the index, and the symbol. And like many terms, those are very good terms. I mean, [10:48] people use them in various ways, not always the way Peirce used them, and there’s debate on how [10:55] Peirce used them, but there’s also a very strong consensus on how Peirce used these signs. [11:02] And, you know, an icon is something which has a correspondence that a speaker perceives [11:10] between the sign and the object. So a photograph is not just that it’s an image of [11:18] the object, but it corresponds. So in any photograph, no matter how vague, if I choose to see it as a [11:24] photograph of myself, I can point out the correspondences. A diagram is a correspondence; [11:30] a tree diagram in syntactic analysis is an icon. An index is something which is physically, [11:38] a sign which is physically connected to its object, such as smoke and fire and footprints, [11:43] and the person who made the footprints. And a symbol is something which is conventionally [11:49] determined, by and large. I’m simplifying in all of these, but it’s a simplified conventionality. [11:57] This has a lot of interest for linguistics and for neuroscience and for the evolution of language, [12:05] and I’ve talked about some of these, and I do plan to explore these in much more detail. [12:11] So the second book that I’m working on relevant to Peirce is Peircean Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Pragmatist Thought, which you will see a similarity with [12:22] Cartesian Linguistics in the title. And in that volume, I plan to sort of, in part, [12:29] go through Cartesian linguistics and show the course how this would work, how this would be [12:33] in Peircean linguistics, and then outline some ideas. So Peirce, it’s difficult to think of [12:40] ways in which he couldn’t influence any part of linguistics, and I want to explore those. [12:46]

JMc: So your plan is basically to take Peircean semiotic theory and turn that into the basis [12:54] of linguistics? Is that the central idea of your Peircean linguistics? [12:57]

DE: No, not necessarily. Semiotics will be a major pillar of that, but more than anything else, [13:04] I mean, the semiotics is very important, but also Peircean inference is very important, because [13:10] one of the fundamental differences… I mean, when Russell and Whitehead wrote Principia Mathematica, they used Peirce’s logic, not Frege’s, but they mainly talked about Frege, [13:21] which was kind of funny, but they used Peirce’s logic, which had been slightly adapted by Peano. [13:28] Peirce introduced universal and existential quantifiers, but Peano just used slightly [13:33] different symbols for those, but that’s the system that Whitehead and Russell used, [13:38] and his inference is very important, whereas Frege introduced compositionality, you know, [13:44] the idea that the meaning of a sentence is the meaning of the parts and the way they were put [13:50] together, which has been by far one of the most influential ideas in modern linguistics. [13:57] Peirce did not propose that type of approach to meaning, and he developed an inferential [14:04] approach, which he formalized in his existential graphs. So, a large part of it will be to show [14:10] how existential graphs can handle not only sentences and propositions, but discourses, [14:17] and I think that counts as a serious advantage.

It also doesn’t require… This is one thing that [14:26] got me interested, in part. It doesn’t require syntactic recursion to get semantic recursion. [14:33] In other words, it’s not Montegovian. It doesn’t follow Richard Montague’s method [14:38] or Frege’s method, and I know that will be heresy to many, and certainly it doesn’t [14:45] imply any disrespect for those works that I think it’s worth exploring an alternative, [14:52] just to see that there is an alternative. I don’t think many linguists consider an alternative to [14:56] compositionality.

So, these are things I want to bring out in the theory, and the first thing I’ve [15:02] ever published sort of in an informal way about this is a chapter in the book Understanding Human Time, where I argue that in Pirahã, also in English, you can’t really understand temporal [15:16] interpretations if you don’t look at inference. And I mean inference across the elements of the [15:23] sentence, outside the sentence in the discourse, and in the context, the cultural-ecological [15:29] context. I give a lot of examples from English in that paper, and from Pirahã, and maybe other [15:36] languages in which I argue that inference is crucial.

JMc: Just on the question of semantics and [15:43] meaning, one of the things that you’ve written about Peirce is, and this is a quote: [15:48] “[F]rom a Peircean perspective, language is a tool […] to transfer information from one mind […] to another [15:54] through the facilitation of inference via an open-ended system of symbols. Language by this [16:00] view is a subtype of communication system. All communication is the transfer of information via [16:07] signs […]” But do you think that this account is faithful to Peirce’s conception of semiotics? [16:14] Because this idea of the transfer of information is a bit narrow, isn’t it? You know, this question [16:19] of exactly what the nature of meaning might be is one of the central questions of much of [16:23] semiotic scholarship. Meaning is often taken to be something much more than just definite [16:29] and determinate information that’s transferred from one mind to another. [16:32]

DE: Well, I absolutely agree with that, but I do think it’s compatible with Peirce. I think that we have [16:39] been influenced in many ways, extremely positively so, by the notion of information that is found [16:46] in computer science that comes out of Claude Shannon’s work. And in that view of information, [16:52] information is primarily based on the form of the message, and it doesn’t really get into meaning. [16:59] It looks at what does the form provide that we didn’t have before, but it doesn’t really get [17:04] into meaning. This is why I think John Searle’s Chinese room argument, which many people hate [17:11] but I like, is still valid, because what Searle tried to show in his Chinese room experiment is [17:17] that a computer using forms only is, in fact, exchanging information with the outside world [17:26] — there’s no question about that — but it’s not a meaning-based information. The interpretant [17:33] is missing. So, in a dyadic semiotics, such as a Saussurean semiotics, the computer is [17:40] performing just fine at a semiotic level. You stick in something from Chinese to the computer [17:47] and it spits out something in English, even though it doesn’t understand it.

But Searle had not read [17:53] much Peirce, and I was sharing an office with Searle, actually, at the time, right after he [17:59] came up with the Chinese room experiment in Brazil. We were in an office together for about [18:03] four months, and as we talked about it, he certainly never mentioned Peirce. He also said [18:08] that he was surprised there wasn’t an easy answer to that. He figured the computer scientists would [18:12] have an easy answer, but they don’t. But from a Peircean perspective, the interpretant is missing. [18:19] And so this is what makes Peircean information very different from Shannon information, and that is [18:26] that meaning really is part of information, and Peirce defines the growth of information as the [18:32] growth of symbols. Increasing the connotation and the denotation together is growth of symbols, [18:39] and so Peirce talks about meaning in a sophisticated way quite extensively. [18:45] So when I talk about information, I’m talking about information that is based on interpretant [18:52] meaning, how we deal with this, how we infer, and so it’s a much richer concept, perhaps not as [19:01] useful to some people as Shannon’s, but from a linguistic perspective, I see it as a much [19:05] richer concept than information in the Shannon model of information. [19:11]

JMc: Yeah, OK, fair enough. [19:13] I think what I was just getting at is that the use of the word “transfer” [19:18] implies to me that the speaker has a meaning that is sort of coded and sent to the recipient, [19:26] who then decodes it, but my understanding of Peirce with this notion of interpretant is that [19:31] it’s a much more open-ended process. The meaning that arises could be surprising even to the [19:37] speaker. [19:38]

DE: Exactly, and this is, when we talk about transfer of information, we don’t mean [19:44] that the final result is the same information for the hearer that it was for the speaker, [19:48] so it would be good to clarify that. It would be good for me to clarify that. [19:52] Because what I mean by transfer is Peircean transfer again, so that the interpretant of [19:56] the hearer may not be the intended interpretant of the speaker, so that the hearer could… the hearer’s interpretation [20:03] could be very surprising, as you just said, for the speaker. So, I agree with that. So, [20:09] transfer only makes sense in the way that I’ve just used it. [20:13]

JMc: You and John Searle sharing an office in Brazil sounds like a great premise for a sitcom. I’d watch that. [20:21]

DE: Yeah, I have great quotes from Searle in the office. You know, I was reading Rules and Representations by Chomsky, and I was a very strong Chomskyan at the time, and there’s a [20:33] passage where he strongly criticizes Searle, and so I turned to John, and I said, “Can I read this [20:38] to you?” And he said, “Sure.” So I read it to him, and I said, “What’s your reaction?” And he got a [20:43] big grin on his face, and he said, “Well, look, Noam and I have an agreement. I never understand [20:48] anything he writes, and he never understands anything I write.” [20:52]

JMc: To compare your Peircean linguistics to Chomsky’s Cartesian linguistics, I guess one point of contrast that immediately [21:01] jumps out is that you seem to be conceiving of language as fundamentally a system of communication, [21:07] but, of course, one of Chomsky’s controversial – and even counterintuitive – claims is that language did [21:15] not evolve for communication, but has been co-opted for this purpose. So, would you say [21:20] that that’s a difference between you and Chomsky? [21:23]

DE: Yes, definitely. And there are, of course, [21:26] several things to say about that. I think some of the biggest differences between Cartesian [21:31] linguistics — and Chomsky’s interpretation of it — and Peircean linguistics — my interpretation of it — [21:36] is nativism, rationalism, nominalism. Chomsky’s a nominalist-conceptualist, whereas Peirce was [21:45] strongly opposed to nominalism and realist in his own view of realism.

But for semiotics, [21:53] for a semiotic theory, the language of thought is semiotics. The language of communication is [22:00] semiotics. You can’t draw that kind of difference, saying that language evolved for thought and was [22:09] then exploited for communication. In fact, we see semiotics in other creatures. We’re not the [22:16] only creatures to communicate semiotically. Other creatures may use symbols, but we’re the only [22:21] ones to use them as an open-ended system of production. We can make any symbol we want as [22:27] soon as we decide we need it. Most animals can’t do that. We’re animals too, but we’re the one [22:31] animal that seems to be able to do that. So, for Peirce, it’s a non-issue to say… In my interpretation [22:38] of Peirce, it’s a non-issue to say that the language of thought was the purpose of language [22:43] and that it eventually evolved into a communication system. Chomsky talks about [22:50] errors that we make when we communicate that we don’t make when we think, [22:55] but there are many possible interpretations of that. I mean, I make errors when I walk [23:03] relative to the way I think about walking. I don’t include stubbing my toe on a [23:10] stool in the kitchen. I don’t think of that when I start walking, and so that’s an error. [23:16] That’s not the nature of walking. It’s just, I made an error, and we make errors in communication [23:21] and in thought. So, I don’t see that… From a semiotic perspective, that is a difference without [23:28] a difference. [23:30]