Many philosophers think that certain things should not be for sale. But should states sell citizenship to foreigners? Consider one recent proposal: President Donald Trump has proposed the “gold card program,” which would allow foreigners to purchase a path to citizenship for five million dollars.

Some philosophers, like Javier Hidalgo, have argued that there is nothing in principle wrong with the state-sponsored sale of citizenship. For what it is worth, I think that Hidalgo is right: there is nothing in principle wrong with the state-sponsored sale of citizenship. Yet, given the world in which we live, I think that certain states should not sell their citizenship. This is because our world is marked by injustice. When certain states sell their citizenship, they undercut our global ability to relate as equals. And because of this, certain states ought not to sell their citizenship. In brief, there are weighty relational egalitarian reasons that count against some states selling their citizenship.

To motivate this argument, it is useful to start by focusing on relational egalitarianism. Roughly, relational egalitarians hold that we should ensure that we can relate to one another as equals. To see what is unique about relational egalitarianism, consider whether we should redistribute socioeconomic resources when socioeconomic inequalities exist. Some egalitarians think that we should redistribute in the presence of socioeconomic inequalities. This is because states of affairs in which socioeconomic inequalities exist are less good than states of affairs in which socioeconomic inequalities do not exist.

By contrast, relational egalitarians argue that we should redistribute socioeconomic resources when socioeconomic inequalities prevent us from relating as equals. If your being wealthier than me prevents us from relating as equals, we should redistribute socioeconomic resources so that we can relate as equals. But if your being wealthier than me does not prevent us from relating as equals, no socioeconomic redistribution is called for.

The market can undermine our ability to relate as equals. You might gain lots of wealth from the market, or you might exercise power over me in the workplace, and this might prevent us from relating as equals. When the market undermines our equality in this way, relational egalitarians argue that we have reasons to limit certain markets. Call this commitment, that we ought to limit markets when markets undermine our ability to relate as equals, Limiting Markets.

Let us consider an example to get a better grasp on how relational egalitarians might limit markets. Consider the case of female sex work, which we can use to inform our treatment of selling citizenship. The world in which we live is marked by gender-based hierarchies that disadvantage women, undermining the conditions that allow men and women to relate as equals. And one way in which these gender-based hierarchies are reinforced is through sex work.

In our world, female sex work undermines women’s ability to relate as equals with men. Debra Satz articulates this thought well, so it is worth quoting her at length:

“If prostitution is wrong it is because of its effects on how men perceive women and on how women perceive themselves. In our society prostitution represents women as the sexual servants of men. It supports and embodies the widely held belief that men have strong sex drives that must be satisfied, largely by gaining access to some woman’s body. This belief underlies the mistaken idea that prostitution is the oldest profession, a necessary consequence of human (i.e., male) nature. It also underlies the traditional conception of marriage, in which a man owned not only his wife’s property but also her body. Indeed, until fairly late in the twentieth century many states did not recognize the possibility of ‘real rape’ in marriage.”

Female sex work contributes to the fact that men wrongly see women as objects rather than subjects. Because of this, relational egalitarians argue that the female sex-work market ought to be limited. By limiting female sex work, relational egalitarians ensure that there are conditions in which men and women can relate as equals. Importantly, relational egalitarians think that we have a reason to limit female sex work even if every female sex worker voluntarily engages in sex work and each transaction is mutually beneficial. What matters fundamentally is that, because female sex work reinforces hierarchies that undermine our ability to relate as equals, female sex work ought to be limited.

Most relational egalitarian analyses stop here. Yet, it is important to note an underemphasized feature of relational egalitarianism. While relational egalitarians have reason to limit female sex work, this reason does not generalize to male sex work. Consider why this is the case. Quite plausibly, when men sell sex, their status as equals is not undermined. Rather, they can continue to relate with women as equals. As a result, relational egalitarians would only have reason to limit certain sex-work markets. They would not have reason to limit all sex work. They would, by contrast, only have reason to limit sex work that prevents men and women from relating as equals. And since only female sex work does this, the relational egalitarian would only have reason to limit female sex work. They would not have reason to limit male sex work. Call this commitment, that we only have relational egalitarian reasons to limit markets insofar as they undermine our ability to relate as equals, the Limited Scope Claim.

Here, let us return to citizenship. While philosophers have argued that it is permissible for states to sell citizenship, we have relational egalitarian reasons that count against some states selling their citizenship. This is because it undermines peoples’ ability to relate as equals across borders.

Globally, there are status hierarchies that turn on citizenship. To see this, think about so-called passport privilege. Roughly, passport privilege refers to the benefits that come with holding a passport from a certain state. For instance, passport-holders from Singapore, Japan, and South Korea can enter at least 190 states without visas. By contrast, passport-holders from other states must apply for visas, costing them time and money.

Importantly, these citizenship-based global hierarchies undermine our ability to relate as equals. Individuals grow to see certain citizenships as valuable and others as less so. And this has real-world, tangible impacts. For instance, in the global health context, those who lack passport privilege are oftentimes unable to attend conferences because they cannot get a visa. And even when they can, it is quite costly. And even then, one has to suffer the “pain, humiliation and frustration of trying to get a visa.” Surely, these harms prevent us from relating as equals across borders.

Allowing states at the top of the global passport hierarchy, like Singapore, to sell citizenship would merely reinforce the existing global hierarchy. Quite plausibly, if states sold citizenship, many individuals would like to purchase citizenship from certain states and not others. Individuals would want Singaporean citizenship but not that of a state lower in the hierarchy. This would serve to reinforce status hierarchies that exist across borders, which prevent us from relating as equals.

Insofar as selling citizenship would reinforce global hierarchies, undermining our ability to relate as equals across borders, we have relational egalitarian reasons to oppose the sale of citizenship by certain states. Per Limiting Markets, we would have reason to oppose the sale of citizenship by states like Singapore if the state-sponsored sale of citizenship reinforced hierarchies that exist across borders. And as in the case of female sex work, this is so, even if every transaction is voluntary and mutually beneficial. What matters is that the state-sponsored sale of citizenship would undermine our ability to relate as equals across borders.

Certain states should not sell their citizenship, for this would undermine our ability to relate as equals across borders. But we need not think that relational egalitarians must condemn all state-sponsored sales of citizenship. Indeed, this is the lesson of the Limited Scope Claim. If the sale of citizenship by some states does not reinforce hierarchies, we would not have relational egalitarian reasons to object to this. Quite plausibly, if states that are low on the passport-privilege hierarchy sell their citizenship, they would not reinforce these hierarchies. Indeed, such transactions would not undermine our ability to relate as equals across borders. Like male sex work, then, it would be permissible for them to sell their citizenship. This is so, even though it would be impermissible for those atop the hierarchy to sell their citizenship.

So, only certain states should be limited from selling their citizenship. When selling citizenship would reinforce global hierarchies, which prevent us from relating as equals, we have relational egalitarian reasons to oppose this sale. But when selling citizenship would not reinforce global hierarchies, selling citizenship is permissible on relational egalitarian grounds. This provides us with very clear guidance in some cases. Singapore, Japan, and South Korea should not be allowed to sell their citizenship. Other states, like Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq should be able to sell their citizenship. But, by way of closing, consider two practical concerns associated with this view.

First, there are surely hard cases. Consider the case of Bulgaria. Should Bulgaria be allowed to sell its citizenship? One might think that the state-sponsored sale of Bulgarian citizenship does not undermine relational equality. We can relate as equals globally, even if Bulgaria sells its citizenship. But Bulgarian citizenship entails European Union citizenship. And we might think that it is impermissible for the European Union to sell its citizenship, as doing so might undermine global relational equality. Here, it is unclear what to do.

Surely, this is a hard case. And it is not clear what relational egalitarians should say. But I think that two things are important to note. On the one hand, rather than lamenting that we face hard cases, we should better try to understand whether relational equality is actually undermined in these cases. Only then will the relational egalitarian view give us clear guidance. On the other hand, we might think that institutions can help us address the hard cases. We might develop an international institution that studies whether a state selling its citizenship would undermine relational equality. And this institution might then decide whether a state should sell its citizenship or not.

Consider a second practical concern: will people buy citizenship from the states that are allowed to sell it? This worry might be motivated by currently existing trends. People want to buy citizenship from states atop the passport hierarchy, not those lower on it. So, why think that people will buy citizenship from those states lower on the hierarchy?

Ultimately, this is an empirical question, so armchair philosophy will do little to settle this question. But I think that we have two reasons to think that people would in fact buy citizenship from states that are allowed to sell it. For one, current trends reflect the fact that even states atop the hierarchy can sell their citizenship. So, it is unclear what would happen if those atop the hierarchy were prevented from doing so. Second, the world in which we live is globalized. And in a globalized world, it might be better to have two citizenships rather than one. This might give all of us some reason to buy citizenship.

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